GHSA-F33Q-WFG9-J2HV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ndisc: fix NULL deref in accept_untracked_na()
accept_untracked_na() re-fetches the inet6_dev with __in6_dev_get(dev) and dereferences idev->cnf.accept_untracked_na without a NULL check, even though its only caller ndisc_recv_na() already fetched and NULL-checked idev for the same device.
Both reads of dev->ip6_ptr run in the same RCU read-side critical section, but a concurrent addrconf_ifdown() can clear dev->ip6_ptr between them: lowering the MTU below IPV6_MIN_MTU calls addrconf_ifdown() without the synchronize_net() that orders the unregister path, so the re-fetch returns NULL and oopses:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in ndisc_recv_na (net/ipv6/ndisc.c:974) Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000364 Call Trace: ndisc_recv_na (net/ipv6/ndisc.c:974) icmpv6_rcv (net/ipv6/icmp.c:1193) ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:479) ip6_input_finish (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:534) ip6_input (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:545) ip6_mc_input (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:635) ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351)
It is reachable by an unprivileged user via a network namespace.
Pass the caller's already validated idev instead of re-fetching it; the idev stays alive for the whole RCU critical section, so it is safe even after dev->ip6_ptr has been cleared.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64542"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-27T21:17:06Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: ndisc: fix NULL deref in accept_untracked_na()\n\naccept_untracked_na() re-fetches the inet6_dev with __in6_dev_get(dev)\nand dereferences idev-\u003ecnf.accept_untracked_na without a NULL check,\neven though its only caller ndisc_recv_na() already fetched and\nNULL-checked idev for the same device.\n\nBoth reads of dev-\u003eip6_ptr run in the same RCU read-side critical\nsection, but a concurrent addrconf_ifdown() can clear dev-\u003eip6_ptr\nbetween them: lowering the MTU below IPV6_MIN_MTU calls addrconf_ifdown()\nwithout the synchronize_net() that orders the unregister path, so the\nre-fetch returns NULL and oopses:\n\n BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in ndisc_recv_na (net/ipv6/ndisc.c:974)\n Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000364\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n ndisc_recv_na (net/ipv6/ndisc.c:974)\n icmpv6_rcv (net/ipv6/icmp.c:1193)\n ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:479)\n ip6_input_finish (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:534)\n ip6_input (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:545)\n ip6_mc_input (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:635)\n ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351)\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n\nIt is reachable by an unprivileged user via a network namespace.\n\nPass the caller\u0027s already validated idev instead of re-fetching it; the\nidev stays alive for the whole RCU critical section, so it is safe even\nafter dev-\u003eip6_ptr has been cleared.",
"id": "GHSA-f33q-wfg9-j2hv",
"modified": "2026-07-27T21:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-07-27T21:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64542"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62c719203cb521b64fab74da94a81bdde5c18808"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63d1c23764de2309cedbb779c75188d257a09d9b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6450f7cfae57b382cbaf66a577765c9a88b3c58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d186e942365acece7c56d39da05dd63bf95b280a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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