GHSA-F854-HPXV-CW9R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-06 18:30 – Updated: 2022-01-06 20:21Impact
In Cronos nodes running versions before v0.6.5, it is possible to take transaction fees from Cosmos SDK's FeeCollector for the current block by sending a custom crafted MsgEthereumTx.
User funds and balances are safe.
Patches
This problem has been patched in Cronos v0.6.5 on the mempool level. The next network upgrade with consensus-breaking changes will patch it on the consensus level.
Workarounds
There are no tested workarounds. All validator node operators are recommended to upgrade to Cronos v0.6.5 at their earliest possible convenience.
Credits
Thank you to @zb3 for reporting this issue on Cronos Immunefi Bug Bounty Program, to @cyril-crypto for reproducing the issue and to @yihuang and @thomas-nguy for patching the issue on the CheckTx (mempool) and the DeliverTx (consensus) levels.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open a discussion in crypto-org-chain/cronos * Email us at chain@crypto.org
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/tharsis/ethermint"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/tharsis/evmos"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/tharsis/ethermint"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.7.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-43839"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-670"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-04T22:40:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-21T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIn Cronos nodes running versions before v0.6.5, it is possible to take transaction fees from Cosmos SDK\u0027s FeeCollector for the current block by sending a custom crafted MsgEthereumTx.\n\nUser funds and balances are safe.\n\n\n### Patches\nThis problem has been patched in Cronos v0.6.5 on the mempool level.\nThe next network upgrade with consensus-breaking changes will patch it on the consensus level.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no tested workarounds. All validator node operators are recommended to upgrade to Cronos v0.6.5 at their earliest possible convenience.\n\n### Credits\nThank you to @zb3 for reporting this issue on [Cronos Immunefi Bug Bounty Program](https://immunefi.com/bounty/cronos/), to @cyril-crypto for reproducing the issue and to @yihuang and @thomas-nguy for patching the issue on the CheckTx (mempool) and the DeliverTx (consensus) levels.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open a discussion in [crypto-org-chain/cronos](https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos/discussions/new)\n* Email us at [chain@crypto.org](mailto:chain@crypto.org)\n",
"id": "GHSA-f854-hpxv-cw9r",
"modified": "2022-01-06T20:21:28Z",
"published": "2022-01-06T18:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos/security/advisories/GHSA-f854-hpxv-cw9r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43839"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos/pull/270"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos/commit/150ef237b37ac28c8136e1c0f494932860b9ebe8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Drainage of FeeCollector\u0027s Block Transaction Fees in cronos"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.