GHSA-FFJ4-JQ7M-9G6V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 21:54 – Updated: 2026-01-13 21:54Summary
GuardDog's safe_extract() function does not validate decompressed file sizes when extracting ZIP archives (wheels, eggs), allowing attackers to cause denial of service through zip bombs. A malicious package can consume gigabytes of disk space from a few megabytes of compressed data.
Vulnerability Details
Affected Component: guarddog/utils/archives.py - safe_extract() function
Vulnerability Type: CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Zip Bomb)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS ~8)
Attack Vector: Network (malicious package uploaded to PyPI/npm) or local
Root Cause
The safe_extract() function handles TAR files securely using the tarsafe library, but ZIP file extraction has no size validation:
elif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive):
with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, "r") as zip:
for file in zip.namelist():
zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file))
Missing protections:
- ❌ No decompressed size limit
- ❌ No compression ratio validation
- ❌ No file count limits
- ❌ No total extracted size validation
Impact
Denial of Service Scenarios
1. CI/CD Pipeline Disruption - Attacker publishes malicious package to PyPI - Developer adds package to requirements.txt - CI/CD runs GuardDog scan - Disk fills (GitHub Actions: standard 14GB limit) - All deployments blocked
2. Resource Exhaustion
- Local development environments
- Security scanning infrastructure
- Automated scanning systems
- Docker containers with limited disk
3. Supply Chain Attack Amplification - Single malicious package blocks security scanning - Prevents detection of other malicious packages - Forces manual intervention - Increases security team workload
Recommended Fix
Add size validation for ZIP files similar to what tarsafe provides for TAR files
Configuration Options
Make limits configurable via environment variables or config file
Additional Improvements
- Add warning logs when archives approach limits
- Provide clear error messages for users
- Document limits in user-facing documentation
- Add tests for zip bomb detection
- Consider using a safe ZIP library (similar to tarsafe)
Credit
Reported by: Charbel (dwbruijn)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "guarddog"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22870"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T21:54:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T21:15:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nGuardDog\u0027s `safe_extract()` function does not validate decompressed file sizes when extracting ZIP archives (wheels, eggs), allowing attackers to cause denial of service through zip bombs. A malicious package can consume gigabytes of disk space from a few megabytes of compressed data.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**Affected Component:** `guarddog/utils/archives.py` - `safe_extract()` function \n**Vulnerability Type:** CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Zip Bomb) \n**Severity:** HIGH (CVSS ~8) \n**Attack Vector:** Network (malicious package uploaded to PyPI/npm) or local\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe `safe_extract()` function handles TAR files securely using the `tarsafe` library, but ZIP file extraction has no size validation:\n```python\nelif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive):\n with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, \"r\") as zip:\n for file in zip.namelist():\n zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file))\n```\n\n**Missing protections:**\n- \u274c No decompressed size limit\n- \u274c No compression ratio validation \n- \u274c No file count limits\n- \u274c No total extracted size validation\n\n## Impact\n\n### Denial of Service Scenarios\n\n**1. CI/CD Pipeline Disruption**\n- Attacker publishes malicious package to PyPI\n- Developer adds package to requirements.txt\n- CI/CD runs GuardDog scan\n- Disk fills (GitHub Actions: standard 14GB limit)\n- All deployments blocked\n\n**2. Resource Exhaustion**\n- Local development environments\n- Security scanning infrastructure \n- Automated scanning systems\n- Docker containers with limited disk\n\n**3. Supply Chain Attack Amplification**\n- Single malicious package blocks security scanning\n- Prevents detection of other malicious packages\n- Forces manual intervention\n- Increases security team workload\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd size validation for ZIP files similar to what `tarsafe` provides for TAR files\n\n### Configuration Options\n\nMake limits configurable via environment variables or config file\n\n## Additional Improvements\n\n1. **Add warning logs** when archives approach limits\n2. **Provide clear error messages** for users\n3. **Document limits** in user-facing documentation\n4. **Add tests** for zip bomb detection\n5. **Consider using a safe ZIP library** (similar to tarsafe)\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by: Charbel (dwbruijn)",
"id": "GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v",
"modified": "2026-01-13T21:54:42Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T21:54:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog/security/advisories/GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22870"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog/commit/c3fb07b4838945f42497e78b7a02bcfb1e63969b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "GuardDog Zip Bomb Vulnerability in safe_extract() Allows DoS"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.