GHSA-FFMG-HFVG-JHG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 22:14 – Updated: 2026-09-16 22:14Summary
Grav 2.0.0-rc.9 and the current 2.0 branch still allow stored CSS injection through Markdown image media actions. The prior media hardening rejects direct ?style= payloads and unsafe attribute() fallbacks, but the adjacent resize() action still writes caller-controlled values directly into styleAttributes.
A publisher who can edit page Markdown can store a crafted image URL that renders additional CSS declarations in the final <img style=...> attribute. This crosses the same lower-privileged publisher to higher-privileged reviewer/admin rendered-content boundary as the earlier media style and attribute advisories.
Impact
A lower-privileged content editor can persist CSS declarations that are rendered when a higher-privileged user views the page or admin preview. The demonstrated payload creates a full-viewport fixed overlay by injecting position:fixed, viewport dimensions, background color, and z-index declarations.
This does not require JavaScript execution. The impact is stored CSS injection in rendered content, with UI redress/overlay and content-manipulation risk in higher-privileged sessions.
Reproduction
Tested versions:
- Grav 2.0 branch commit
6582166173bb8eb5869d96aea384e0e73777c94c - Grav
2.0.0-rc.9commite03d29aa0d3ece16d73c1ffccfa78df8bf5f28b8
Minimal Markdown payload:

A minimal PHPUnit-style reproducer can drive the same parser path directly:
$m = new class {
use \Grav\Common\Media\Traits\MediaObjectTrait;
use \Grav\Common\Media\Traits\StaticResizeTrait;
public function addMetaFile($filepath) {}
public function __toString(): string { return ''; }
public function url($reset = true) { return '/img.png'; }
public function get($name, mixed $default = null, $separator = null) { return $default; }
public function set($name, mixed $value, $separator = null) { return $this; }
protected function createThumbnail($thumb) { return null; }
protected function createLink(array $attributes) { return null; }
protected function getItems(): array { return []; }
};
$excerpts = new \Grav\Common\Page\Markdown\Excerpts(null, ['markdown' => [], 'images' => []]);
$m = $excerpts->processMediaActions(
$m,
'image.png?resize=100;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;width:100vw;height:100vh;background:white;z-index:9999,200'
);
$element = $m->parsedownElement('', '', '', '', false);
var_dump($element['attributes']['style']);
Observed style attribute:
width: 100;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;width:100vw;height:100vh;background:white;z-index:9999px;height: 200px;
The appended px lands on the final z-index value, but the preceding injected declarations remain syntactically valid CSS.
Root Cause / Technical Details
system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Markdown/Excerpts.php::processMediaActions() parses the image query string into media actions and invokes the requested public media method with call_user_func_array([$medium, $action['method']], $args).
For resize(), system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/StaticResizeTrait.php::resize() stores width and height directly into style attributes:
$this->styleAttributes['width'] = $width . 'px';
$this->styleAttributes['height'] = $height . 'px';
It does not verify that the values are numeric, length-only, or free of CSS declaration delimiters. Later, system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaObjectTrait.php::parsedownElement() serializes keyed style attributes as raw CSS declarations:
$style .= $key . ': ' . $value . ';';
The sanitizer added for direct style() inputs is not reached for values introduced by resize(). As a result, resize=100;position:fixed;...,200 breaks out of the intended width: value and injects additional declarations.
PoC Evidence
On both current 2.0 and 2.0.0-rc.9, the targeted regression test produced the injected style string above. Existing tests still confirm the direct style() and attribute() paths are rejected; the bypass is specific to the adjacent resize() styleAttributes path.
Remediation
Sanitize or type-normalize all values before they enter styleAttributes, not only values passed through MediaObjectTrait::style(). For resize(), cast or validate width and height as numeric values before appending px, or use a shared CSS declaration builder that rejects semicolons, colons, property names, and other declaration-breaking characters. Add regression coverage for resize=100;position:fixed;top:0,200 and any other media action that writes to styleAttributes directly.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0-rc.9"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.0.0-rc.9"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58657"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T22:14:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nGrav 2.0.0-rc.9 and the current 2.0 branch still allow stored CSS injection through Markdown image media actions. The prior media hardening rejects direct `?style=` payloads and unsafe `attribute()` fallbacks, but the adjacent `resize()` action still writes caller-controlled values directly into `styleAttributes`.\n\nA publisher who can edit page Markdown can store a crafted image URL that renders additional CSS declarations in the final `\u003cimg style=...\u003e` attribute. This crosses the same lower-privileged publisher to higher-privileged reviewer/admin rendered-content boundary as the earlier media style and attribute advisories.\n\n## Impact\n\nA lower-privileged content editor can persist CSS declarations that are rendered when a higher-privileged user views the page or admin preview. The demonstrated payload creates a full-viewport fixed overlay by injecting `position:fixed`, viewport dimensions, background color, and z-index declarations.\n\nThis does not require JavaScript execution. The impact is stored CSS injection in rendered content, with UI redress/overlay and content-manipulation risk in higher-privileged sessions.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nTested versions:\n\n- Grav 2.0 branch commit `6582166173bb8eb5869d96aea384e0e73777c94c`\n- Grav `2.0.0-rc.9` commit `e03d29aa0d3ece16d73c1ffccfa78df8bf5f28b8`\n\nMinimal Markdown payload:\n\n```markdown\n\n```\n\nA minimal PHPUnit-style reproducer can drive the same parser path directly:\n\n```php\n$m = new class {\n use \\Grav\\Common\\Media\\Traits\\MediaObjectTrait;\n use \\Grav\\Common\\Media\\Traits\\StaticResizeTrait;\n\n public function addMetaFile($filepath) {}\n public function __toString(): string { return \u0027\u0027; }\n public function url($reset = true) { return \u0027/img.png\u0027; }\n public function get($name, mixed $default = null, $separator = null) { return $default; }\n public function set($name, mixed $value, $separator = null) { return $this; }\n protected function createThumbnail($thumb) { return null; }\n protected function createLink(array $attributes) { return null; }\n protected function getItems(): array { return []; }\n};\n\n$excerpts = new \\Grav\\Common\\Page\\Markdown\\Excerpts(null, [\u0027markdown\u0027 =\u003e [], \u0027images\u0027 =\u003e []]);\n$m = $excerpts-\u003eprocessMediaActions(\n $m,\n \u0027image.png?resize=100;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;width:100vw;height:100vh;background:white;z-index:9999,200\u0027\n);\n$element = $m-\u003eparsedownElement(\u0027\u0027, \u0027\u0027, \u0027\u0027, \u0027\u0027, false);\nvar_dump($element[\u0027attributes\u0027][\u0027style\u0027]);\n```\n\nObserved style attribute:\n\n```text\nwidth: 100;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;width:100vw;height:100vh;background:white;z-index:9999px;height: 200px;\n```\n\nThe appended `px` lands on the final `z-index` value, but the preceding injected declarations remain syntactically valid CSS.\n\n## Root Cause / Technical Details\n\n`system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Markdown/Excerpts.php::processMediaActions()` parses the image query string into media actions and invokes the requested public media method with `call_user_func_array([$medium, $action[\u0027method\u0027]], $args)`.\n\nFor `resize()`, `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/StaticResizeTrait.php::resize()` stores width and height directly into style attributes:\n\n```php\n$this-\u003estyleAttributes[\u0027width\u0027] = $width . \u0027px\u0027;\n$this-\u003estyleAttributes[\u0027height\u0027] = $height . \u0027px\u0027;\n```\n\nIt does not verify that the values are numeric, length-only, or free of CSS declaration delimiters. Later, `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaObjectTrait.php::parsedownElement()` serializes keyed style attributes as raw CSS declarations:\n\n```php\n$style .= $key . \u0027: \u0027 . $value . \u0027;\u0027;\n```\n\nThe sanitizer added for direct `style()` inputs is not reached for values introduced by `resize()`. As a result, `resize=100;position:fixed;...,200` breaks out of the intended `width:` value and injects additional declarations.\n\n## PoC Evidence\n\nOn both current 2.0 and 2.0.0-rc.9, the targeted regression test produced the injected style string above. Existing tests still confirm the direct `style()` and `attribute()` paths are rejected; the bypass is specific to the adjacent `resize()` styleAttributes path.\n\n## Remediation\n\nSanitize or type-normalize all values before they enter `styleAttributes`, not only values passed through `MediaObjectTrait::style()`. For `resize()`, cast or validate width and height as numeric values before appending `px`, or use a shared CSS declaration builder that rejects semicolons, colons, property names, and other declaration-breaking characters. Add regression coverage for `resize=100;position:fixed;top:0,200` and any other media action that writes to `styleAttributes` directly.",
"id": "GHSA-ffmg-hfvg-jhg9",
"modified": "2026-09-16T22:14:53Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T22:14:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-ffmg-hfvg-jhg9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58657"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/6582166173bb8eb5869d96aea384e0e73777c94c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/e03d29aa0d3ece16d73c1ffccfa78df8bf5f28b8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-stored-css-injection-via-markdown-image-resize-action"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Grav: Stored CSS injection via Markdown image resize() bypasses prior media style sanitizers in Grav"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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