GHSA-FG94-H982-F3MM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:06 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:06
VLAI
Summary
Claude Code: Out-of-Band Data Exfiltration via Pre-Approved HuggingFace Domain in WebFetch
Details

Because the hostname huggingface.co was pre-approved as a bare hostname for the WebFetch tool, any path on that domain—including attacker-controlled model repositories—was auto-approved without a permission prompt or being subject to --allowedTools restrictions. An attacker able to inject untrusted content into a Claude Code context could direct it to issue WebFetch requests against attacker-controlled repository files (e.g. /resolve/main/config.json), which HuggingFace counts as downloads server-side, creating a covert out-of-band channel for encoding and exfiltrating data Claude can access such as files, environment variables, or command output. Reliably exploiting this required the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already; users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.

Thank you to hackerone.com/novee for reporting this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.2.54"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.163"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54316"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-183",
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-515"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T18:06:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Because the hostname huggingface.co was pre-approved as a bare hostname for the WebFetch tool, any path on that domain\u2014including attacker-controlled model repositories\u2014was auto-approved without a permission prompt or being subject to --allowedTools restrictions. An attacker able to inject untrusted content into a Claude Code context could direct it to issue WebFetch requests against attacker-controlled repository files (e.g. /resolve/main/config.json), which HuggingFace counts as downloads server-side, creating a covert out-of-band channel for encoding and exfiltrating data Claude can access such as files, environment variables, or command output. Reliably exploiting this required the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already; users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.\n\nThank you to hackerone.com/novee for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-fg94-h982-f3mm",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T18:06:42Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T18:06:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-fg94-h982-f3mm"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Claude Code: Out-of-Band Data Exfiltration via Pre-Approved HuggingFace Domain in WebFetch"
}


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