GHSA-FJ6F-975W-5XRX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-22 18:30 – Updated: 2025-09-23 21:30
VLAI?
Details

AiKaan Cloud Controller uses a single hardcoded SSH private key and the username proxyuser for remote terminal access to all managed IoT/edge devices. When an administrator initiates "Open Remote Terminal" from the AiKaan dashboard, the controller sends this same static private key to the target device. The device then uses it to establish a reverse SSH tunnel to a remote access server, enabling browser-based SSH access for the administrator. Because the same proxyuser account and SSH key are reused across all customer environments: - An attacker who obtains the key (e.g., by intercepting it in transit, extracting it from the remote access server, or from a compromised admin account) can impersonate any managed device. - They can establish unauthorized reverse SSH tunnels and interact with devices without the owner's consent. This is a design flaw in the authentication model: compromise of a single key compromises the trust boundary between the controller and devices.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-57601"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-798"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-22T16:15:45Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "AiKaan Cloud Controller uses a single hardcoded SSH private key and the username `proxyuser` for remote terminal access to all managed IoT/edge devices. When an administrator initiates \"Open Remote Terminal\" from the AiKaan dashboard, the controller sends this same static private key to the target device. The device then uses it to establish a reverse SSH tunnel to a remote access server, enabling browser-based SSH access for the administrator. Because the same `proxyuser` account and SSH key are reused across all customer environments: - An attacker who obtains the key (e.g., by intercepting it in transit, extracting it from the remote access server, or from a compromised admin account) can impersonate any managed device. - They can establish unauthorized reverse SSH tunnels and interact with devices without the owner\u0027s consent. This is a design flaw in the authentication model: compromise of a single key compromises the trust boundary between the controller and devices.",
  "id": "GHSA-fj6f-975w-5xrx",
  "modified": "2025-09-23T21:30:54Z",
  "published": "2025-09-22T18:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57601"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Shubhangborkar/aikaan-vulnerabilities/blob/main/cve1-shared-ssh-key.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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