GHSA-FJW2-7QV4-GQXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-30 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-30 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: set page extent mapped after read_folio in relocate_one_page
One of the CI runs triggered the following panic
assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 923660 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #1 pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 sp : ffff800093213720 x29: ffff800093213720 x28: ffff8000932138b4 x27: 000000000c280000 x26: 00000001b5d00000 x25: 000000000c281000 x24: 000000000c281fff x23: 0000000000001000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff42b95bf880 x20: ffff42b9528e0000 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 667274622f736620 x16: 6e69202c65746176 x15: 0000000000000028 x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 00000000002672d7 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: ffffcd3f0ccd9204 x10: ffffcd3f0554ae50 x9 : ffffcd3f0379528c x8 : ffff800093213428 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffcd3f091771e8 x5 : ffff42b97f333948 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff42b9556cde80 x0 : 000000000000004f Call trace: btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 btrfs_subpage_set_dirty+0x38/0xa0 btrfs_page_set_dirty+0x58/0x88 relocate_one_page+0x204/0x5f0 relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x11c/0x180 relocate_data_extent+0xd0/0xf8 relocate_block_group+0x3d0/0x4e8 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2d8/0x490 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x54/0x1a8 btrfs_balance+0x7f4/0x1150 btrfs_ioctl+0x10f0/0x20b8 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x120/0x11d8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8 do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x158 el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 Code: 91098021 b0007fa0 91346000 97e9c6d2 (d4210000)
This is the same problem outlined in 17b17fcd6d44 ("btrfs: set_page_extent_mapped after read_folio in btrfs_cont_expand") , and the fix is the same. I originally looked for the same pattern elsewhere in our code, but mistakenly skipped over this code because I saw the page cache readahead before we set_page_extent_mapped, not realizing that this was only in the !page case, that we can still end up with a !uptodate page and then do the btrfs_read_folio further down.
The fix here is the same as the above mentioned patch, move the set_page_extent_mapped call to after the btrfs_read_folio() block to make sure that we have the subpage blocksize stuff setup properly before using the page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-54253"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-30T13:16:13Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: set page extent mapped after read_folio in relocate_one_page\n\nOne of the CI runs triggered the following panic\n\n assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) \u0026\u0026 page-\u003eprivate, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229!\n Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP\n CPU: 0 PID: 923660 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #1\n pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0\n lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0\n sp : ffff800093213720\n x29: ffff800093213720 x28: ffff8000932138b4 x27: 000000000c280000\n x26: 00000001b5d00000 x25: 000000000c281000 x24: 000000000c281fff\n x23: 0000000000001000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff42b95bf880\n x20: ffff42b9528e0000 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: ffffffffffffffff\n x17: 667274622f736620 x16: 6e69202c65746176 x15: 0000000000000028\n x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 00000000002672d7 x12: 0000000000000000\n x11: ffffcd3f0ccd9204 x10: ffffcd3f0554ae50 x9 : ffffcd3f0379528c\n x8 : ffff800093213428 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffcd3f091771e8\n x5 : ffff42b97f333948 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000\n x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff42b9556cde80 x0 : 000000000000004f\n Call trace:\n btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0\n btrfs_subpage_set_dirty+0x38/0xa0\n btrfs_page_set_dirty+0x58/0x88\n relocate_one_page+0x204/0x5f0\n relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x11c/0x180\n relocate_data_extent+0xd0/0xf8\n relocate_block_group+0x3d0/0x4e8\n btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2d8/0x490\n btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x54/0x1a8\n btrfs_balance+0x7f4/0x1150\n btrfs_ioctl+0x10f0/0x20b8\n __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x120/0x11d8\n invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8\n do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x158\n el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130\n el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198\n Code: 91098021 b0007fa0 91346000 97e9c6d2 (d4210000)\n\nThis is the same problem outlined in 17b17fcd6d44 (\"btrfs:\nset_page_extent_mapped after read_folio in btrfs_cont_expand\") , and the\nfix is the same. I originally looked for the same pattern elsewhere in\nour code, but mistakenly skipped over this code because I saw the page\ncache readahead before we set_page_extent_mapped, not realizing that\nthis was only in the !page case, that we can still end up with a\n!uptodate page and then do the btrfs_read_folio further down.\n\nThe fix here is the same as the above mentioned patch, move the\nset_page_extent_mapped call to after the btrfs_read_folio() block to\nmake sure that we have the subpage blocksize stuff setup properly before\nusing the page.",
"id": "GHSA-fjw2-7qv4-gqxh",
"modified": "2025-12-30T15:30:33Z",
"published": "2025-12-30T15:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-54253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08daa38ca212d87f77beae839bc9be71079c7abf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d1e020ed9649cf140fcfafd052cfdcce9e9d67d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7f1326cc24e22b38afc3acd328480a1183f9e79"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
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