GHSA-FPGF-PJJV-2QGM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-30 04:37 – Updated: 2022-09-30 04:37
VLAI?
Summary
matrix-android-sdk2 vulnerable to Olm/Megolm protocol confusion
Details

Impact

An attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield.

Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device.

These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm.

Patches

matrix-android-sdk2 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption.

Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added: - Cleartext m.room_key, m.forwarded_room_key and m.secret.send to_device messages are discarded. - Secrets received from untrusted devices are discarded. - Key backups are only usable if they have a valid signature from a trusted device (no more local trust, or trust-on-decrypt). - The origin of a to-device message should only be determined by observing the Olm session which managed to decrypt the message, and not by using claimed sender_key, user_id, or any other fields controllable by the homeserver.

Workarounds

As this attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, if you trust your home server no particular workaround is needed. Notice that the backup spoofing attack is a particularly sophisticated targeted attack.

We are not aware of this attack being used in the wild, though specifying a false positive-free way of noticing malicious key backups key is challenging.

As an abundance of caution, to avoid malicious backup attacks, you should not verify your new logins using emoji/QR verifications methods until patched. Prefer using verify with passphrase.

References

Blog post: https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, e-mail us at security@matrix.org.

Severity ?
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.36"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-39248"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-322"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-30T04:37:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-28T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAn attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. \n\nAdditionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device.\n\nThese attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm.\n\n### Patches\n\nmatrix-android-sdk2 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption.\n\nOut of caution, several other checks have been audited or added:\n- Cleartext `m.room_key`, `m.forwarded_room_key` and `m.secret.send` to_device messages are discarded.\n- Secrets received from untrusted devices are discarded.\n- Key backups are only usable if they have a valid signature from a trusted device (no more local trust, or trust-on-decrypt).\n- The origin of a to-device message should only be determined by observing the Olm session which managed to decrypt the message, and not by using claimed sender_key, user_id, or any other fields controllable by the homeserver.\n\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAs this attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, if you trust your home server no particular workaround is needed.  Notice that the backup spoofing attack is a particularly sophisticated targeted attack.\n\nWe are not aware of this attack being used in the wild, though specifying a false positive-free way of noticing malicious key backups key is challenging.\n\nAs an abundance of caution, to avoid malicious backup attacks, you should not verify your new logins using emoji/QR verifications methods until patched. Prefer using verify with passphrase.\n\n\n### References\nBlog post: https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, e-mail us at [security@matrix.org](mailto:security@matrix.org).\n",
  "id": "GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm",
  "modified": "2022-09-30T04:37:39Z",
  "published": "2022-09-30T04:37:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/security/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39248"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/commit/77df720a238d17308deab83ecaa37f7a4740a17e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/releases/tag/v1.5.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "matrix-android-sdk2 vulnerable to Olm/Megolm protocol confusion"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



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