GHSA-FR88-W35C-R596

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 00:21 – Updated: 2026-03-11 00:21
VLAI?
Summary
Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing
Details

Impact

The OAuth2 authentication adapter, when configured without the useridField option, only verifies that a token is active via the provider's token introspection endpoint, but does not verify that the token belongs to the user identified by authData.id. An attacker with any valid OAuth2 token from the same provider can authenticate as any other user.

This affects any Parse Server deployment that uses the generic OAuth2 authentication adapter (configured with oauth2: true) without setting the useridField option.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed by defaulting useridField to sub, which is the standard subject identifier field defined by RFC 7662. The adapter now always validates the token's identity against the claimed user ID, even when useridField is not explicitly configured.

Workarounds

Set the useridField option to the appropriate field name for your OAuth2 provider (e.g. sub) in the Parse Server authentication configuration.

References

  • GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596
  • Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.2-alpha.9
  • Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.22
Severity ?
7.6 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.5.2-alpha.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.6.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30967"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:21:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T21:16:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe OAuth2 authentication adapter, when configured without the `useridField` option, only verifies that a token is active via the provider\u0027s token introspection endpoint, but does not verify that the token belongs to the user identified by `authData.id`. An attacker with any valid OAuth2 token from the same provider can authenticate as any other user.\n\nThis affects any Parse Server deployment that uses the generic OAuth2 authentication adapter (configured with `oauth2: true`) without setting the `useridField` option.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability is fixed by defaulting `useridField` to `sub`, which is the standard subject identifier field defined by [RFC 7662](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662). The adapter now always validates the token\u0027s identity against the claimed user ID, even when `useridField` is not explicitly configured.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nSet the `useridField` option to the appropriate field name for your OAuth2 provider (e.g. `sub`) in the Parse Server authentication configuration.\n\n### References\n\n- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596\n- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.2-alpha.9\n- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.22",
  "id": "GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596",
  "modified": "2026-03-11T00:21:37Z",
  "published": "2026-03-11T00:21:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30967"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.2-alpha.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.