GHSA-FVHJ-4QFH-Q2HM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-05 18:11 – Updated: 2023-12-07 23:06Summary
When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query.
When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions.
Details
For example, we have this Nginx configuration:
location /admin {
deny all;
return 403;
}
This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin
This won’t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment.
However, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become
/%23/../admin
And allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy.
Here is a diagram to summarize the attack:
PoC
This is the POC docker I've set up. It contains Nginx, Traefik proxies and a backend server running PHP.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vLnA0g7N7ZKhLNmHmuJ4JJjV_J2akNMt/view?usp=sharing
Impact
This allows the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from Front-End proxy.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.10.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.0-beta5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-47106"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-177",
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-05T18:11:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-04T21:15:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWhen a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query.\n\nWhen this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control\nrestrictions. \n\n### Details\nFor example, we have this Nginx configuration:\n\n```\nlocation /admin {\n deny all;\n return 403;\n}\n```\nThis can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin\n\nThis won\u2019t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment.\n\nHowever, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become\n\n/%23/../admin\n\nAnd allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy.\n\nHere is a diagram to summarize the attack:\n\n\n\n### PoC\n\n\nThis is the POC docker I\u0027ve set up. It contains Nginx, Traefik proxies and a backend server running PHP.\n\nhttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1vLnA0g7N7ZKhLNmHmuJ4JJjV_J2akNMt/view?usp=sharing\n\n### Impact\nThis allows the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from Front-End proxy.",
"id": "GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm",
"modified": "2023-12-07T23:06:09Z",
"published": "2023-12-05T18:11:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7230#section-5.3.1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.10.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.0.0-beta5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik incorrectly processes fragment in the URL, leads to Authorization Bypass"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.