GHSA-FVVM-949W-QJ4W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-20 15:30 – Updated: 2026-05-20 15:30
VLAI
Summary
RTK improperly trusts project-local filter configuration, allowing silent tampering of command output shown to LLM
Details

RTK (Rust Token Killer) improperly trusts project-local configuration files. In versions prior to 0.32.0, RTK automatically loads .rtk/filters.toml from the working directory with highest priority and without user notification. An attacker can place a malicious filter file in a repository to apply regex-based modifications (e.g., strip_lines_matching) to shell command output before it is shown to the LLM, without any indication that the output has been modified.

This allows attackers to selectively suppress or alter command output (including file contents, diffs, and security scan results) without detection, potentially concealing malicious code during AI-assisted development or review.

Patch

Fixed in v0.32.0 (PRs #623, #625):

  • .rtk/filters.toml is now blocked by default when untrusted, with a visible warning: [rtk] WARNING: untrusted project filters — Filters NOT applied. Run rtk trust to review and enable.
  • SHA-256 hash verification: if the file changes after trust, filters are blocked again until re-reviewed.
  • New rtk trust / rtk untrust commands for explicit user consent.
  • Trust store implemented in src/trust.rs; trust gate added in src/toml_filter.rs.
Severity
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rtk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.32.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45792"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-426"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-20T15:30:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "RTK (Rust Token Killer) improperly trusts project-local configuration files. In versions prior to 0.32.0, RTK automatically loads `.rtk/filters.toml` from the working directory with highest priority and without user notification. An attacker can place a malicious filter file in a repository to apply regex-based modifications (e.g., `strip_lines_matching`) to shell command output before it is shown to the LLM, without any indication that the output has been modified.\n\nThis allows attackers to selectively suppress or alter command output (including file contents, diffs, and security scan results) without detection, potentially concealing malicious code during AI-assisted development or review.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in v0.32.0 (PRs #623, #625):\n\n- `.rtk/filters.toml` is now blocked by default when untrusted, with a visible warning: `[rtk] WARNING: untrusted project filters \u2014 Filters NOT applied. Run rtk trust to review and enable.`\n- SHA-256 hash verification: if the file changes after trust, filters are blocked again until re-reviewed.\n- New `rtk trust` / `rtk untrust` commands for explicit user consent.\n- Trust store implemented in `src/trust.rs`; trust gate added in `src/toml_filter.rs`.",
  "id": "GHSA-fvvm-949w-qj4w",
  "modified": "2026-05-20T15:30:04Z",
  "published": "2026-05-20T15:30:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rtk-ai/rtk/security/advisories/GHSA-fvvm-949w-qj4w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rtk-ai/rtk/pull/623"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rtk-ai/rtk/pull/625"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rtk-ai/rtk"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RTK improperly trusts project-local filter configuration, allowing silent tampering of command output shown to LLM"
}


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