GHSA-FWRG-J278-R47C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-14 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: serialize udp bearer replicast list updates
tipc_udp_rcast_add() and cleanup_bearer() both update ub->rcast.list with list_add_rcu() / list_del_rcu(), but nothing serializes them. The add runs from the encap receive softirq (via tipc_udp_rcast_disc()) without rtnl_lock(), so it can race the cleanup delete and corrupt the list:
list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff8880298d7ab8, but was ffff88802449ad38. (prev=ffff888027e3ec98) kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62! RIP: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x17a/0x200 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Call Trace: cleanup_bearer (net/tipc/udp_media.c:811) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3302) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3466)
The bearer can be enabled from an unprivileged user namespace, as the TIPCv2 generic-netlink ops carry no GENL_ADMIN_PERM.
Add a spinlock to struct udp_bearer and take it around the list_add_rcu() in tipc_udp_rcast_add() and the list_del_rcu() loop in cleanup_bearer() so the two writers can no longer corrupt the list.
Reject a duplicate peer under the same lock before allocating, and remove tipc_udp_is_known_peer(). The old lockless pre-check in tipc_udp_rcast_disc() was racy: two softirqs discovering the same peer could both find it absent and add it twice.
cleanup_bearer() runs from a workqueue after tipc_udp_disable() clears the bearer's up bit, so an encap softirq can still reach tipc_udp_rcast_add() and add a peer after cleanup_bearer() has already emptied the list, leaking that entry when the bearer is freed. Mark the bearer disabled under rcast_lock once the list is emptied and refuse further additions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68323"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: serialize udp bearer replicast list updates\n\ntipc_udp_rcast_add() and cleanup_bearer() both update ub-\u003ercast.list with\nlist_add_rcu() / list_del_rcu(), but nothing serializes them. The add runs\nfrom the encap receive softirq (via tipc_udp_rcast_disc()) without\nrtnl_lock(), so it can race the cleanup delete and corrupt the list:\n\n list_del corruption. prev-\u003enext should be ffff8880298d7ab8,\n but was ffff88802449ad38. (prev=ffff888027e3ec98)\n kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62!\n RIP: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x17a/0x200\n Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer\n Call Trace:\n cleanup_bearer (net/tipc/udp_media.c:811)\n process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3302)\n worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3466)\n\nThe bearer can be enabled from an unprivileged user namespace, as the\nTIPCv2 generic-netlink ops carry no GENL_ADMIN_PERM.\n\nAdd a spinlock to struct udp_bearer and take it around the list_add_rcu()\nin tipc_udp_rcast_add() and the list_del_rcu() loop in cleanup_bearer() so\nthe two writers can no longer corrupt the list.\n\nReject a duplicate peer under the same lock before allocating, and remove\ntipc_udp_is_known_peer(). The old lockless pre-check in\ntipc_udp_rcast_disc() was racy: two softirqs discovering the same peer\ncould both find it absent and add it twice.\n\ncleanup_bearer() runs from a workqueue after tipc_udp_disable() clears the\nbearer\u0027s up bit, so an encap softirq can still reach tipc_udp_rcast_add()\nand add a peer after cleanup_bearer() has already emptied the list, leaking\nthat entry when the bearer is freed. Mark the bearer disabled under\nrcast_lock once the list is emptied and refuse further additions.",
"id": "GHSA-fwrg-j278-r47c",
"modified": "2026-08-14T00:31:55Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/350e592ff4e30e48ffb55e142d11a73e63f4869c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d70c81001df9320d3445e664428a1d408b5ba896"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
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|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.