GHSA-FX7F-GHJH-G2GW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program
fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like below:
int main(void ctx) { void ptr = main; ... bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr); ... }
The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address.
Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98075"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:36Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program\n\nfixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real\nfunction addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs()\nonly when env-\u003esubprog_cnt \u003e 1. Meaning that for any program like\nbelow:\n\n int main(void *ctx) {\n void *ptr = main;\n ...\n bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);\n ...\n }\n\nThe \u0027ptr\u0027 won\u0027t be ever converted to contain an address.\nIn combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a\nfunction call at a bogus address.\n\nInstead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful\nprogram needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject\nBPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.",
"id": "GHSA-fx7f-ghjh-g2gw",
"modified": "2026-09-25T12:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98075"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/118212417ba0120d99f84154799f8880f07411f4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/374b2c5561db80fcdd7cdce44af37a49416f61c7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92f0bd0e2b632c6565ac2214a4d7d2ed37e5b9f6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6c39774ae093c9f7009cc4ae918f18fc1af7ae7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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