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GHSA-G2P6-HH5V-7HFM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 15:40 – Updated: 2026-03-13 15:40
VLAI
Summary
Poseidon V1 variable-length input collision via implicit zero-padding
Details

Impact

Poseidon V1 (PoseidonSponge) accepts variable-length inputs without injective padding. When a caller provides fewer inputs than the sponge rate (inputs.len() < T - 1), unused rate positions are implicitly zero-filled. This allows trivial hash collisions: for any input vector [m1, ..., mk] hashed with a sponge of rate > k, hash([m1, ..., mk]) equals hash([m1, ..., mk, 0]) because both produce identical pre-permutation states.

This affects any use of PoseidonSponge or poseidon_hash where the number of inputs is less than T - 1 (e.g., hashing 1 input with T=3).

Poseidon2 (Poseidon2Sponge) is not affected — it encodes the input length in the capacity element (IV = input_len << 64), making different-length inputs produce distinct states.

Patches

Fixed by enforcing inputs.len() == RATE in PoseidonSponge::compute_hash, matching circom's invariant that nInputs always equals T - 1. Users should upgrade to the next release containing this fix.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

  • Ensure callers always use T = inputs.len() + 1 (full-rate), which is how circom uses Poseidon. For example, to hash 2 inputs, use T=3; to hash 1 input, use T=2. Never use a sponge with more rate capacity than the number of inputs.
  • Alternatively, migrate to Poseidon2Sponge, which is safe for variable-length inputs due to its length-encoding IV.

References

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "soroban-poseidon"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "25.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32129"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-328"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T15:40:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T18:16:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nPoseidon V1 (`PoseidonSponge`) accepts variable-length inputs without injective padding. When a caller provides fewer inputs than the sponge rate (`inputs.len() \u003c T - 1`), unused rate positions are implicitly zero-filled. This allows trivial hash collisions: for any input vector `[m1, ..., mk]` hashed with a sponge of rate \u003e k, `hash([m1, ..., mk])` equals `hash([m1, ..., mk, 0])` because both produce identical pre-permutation states.\n\nThis affects any use of `PoseidonSponge` or `poseidon_hash` where the number of inputs is less than `T - 1` (e.g., hashing 1 input with `T=3`).\n\nPoseidon2 (`Poseidon2Sponge`) is **not affected** \u2014 it encodes the input length in the capacity element (`IV = input_len \u003c\u003c 64`), making different-length inputs produce distinct states.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed by enforcing `inputs.len() == RATE` in `PoseidonSponge::compute_hash`, matching circom\u0027s invariant that `nInputs` always equals `T - 1`. Users should upgrade to the next release containing this fix.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Ensure callers **always** use `T = inputs.len() + 1` (full-rate), which is how circom uses Poseidon. For example, to hash 2 inputs, use `T=3`; to hash 1 input, use `T=2`. Never use a sponge with more rate capacity than the number of inputs.\n- Alternatively, migrate to `Poseidon2Sponge`, which is safe for variable-length inputs due to its length-encoding IV.\n\n## References\n- [circom Poseidon implementation](https://github.com/iden3/circomlib/blob/master/circuits/poseidon.circom) \u2014 reference implementation where `nInputs` determines `T`\n- [Poseidon paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/458) \u2014 Section 4 discusses sponge construction and padding requirements",
  "id": "GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T15:40:31Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T15:40:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stellar/rs-soroban-poseidon/security/advisories/GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32129"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stellar/rs-soroban-poseidon/pull/10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stellar/rs-soroban-poseidon/commit/ceb20d3593fc4a8a951a7e99d8fa2344f8250a8c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/stellar/rs-soroban-poseidon"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stellar/rs-soroban-poseidon/releases/tag/v25.0.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Poseidon V1 variable-length input collision via implicit zero-padding"
}



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