GHSA-G2RQ-JV54-WCPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-17 19:27 – Updated: 2025-09-26 16:16Impact
There are multiple server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in the DragonFly2 system. The vulnerabilities enable users to force DragonFly2’s components to make requests to internal services, which otherwise are not accessible to the users. One SSRF attack vector is exposed by the Manager’s API. The API allows users to create jobs. When creating a Preheat type of a job, users provide a URL that the Manager connects to (see figures 2.1–2.3). The URL is weakly validated, and so users can trick the Manager into sending HTTP requests to services that are in the Manager’s local network.
func (p *preheat) CreatePreheat(ctx context.Context, schedulers []models.Scheduler,
json types.PreheatArgs) (*internaljob.GroupJobState, error) {
[skipped]
url := json.URL
[skipped]
// Generate download files
var files []internaljob.PreheatRequest
switch PreheatType(json.Type) {
case PreheatImageType:
// Parse image manifest url
skipped, err := parseAccessURL(url) [skipped]
[skipped]
case PreheatFileType: [skipped]
}
A second attack vector is in peer-to-peer communication. A peer can ask another peer to make a request to an arbitrary URL by triggering the pieceManager.DownloadSource method (figure 2.4), which calls the httpSourceClient.GetMetadata method, which performs the request.
Another attack vector is due to the fact that HTTP clients used by the DragonFly2’s components do not disable support for HTTP redirects. This configuration means that an HTTP request sent to a malicious server may be redirected by the server to a component’s internal service.
Patches
- Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above.
Workarounds
There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading.
References
A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the full report.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at dragonfly-maintainers@googlegroups.com.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "d7y.io/dragonfly/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59346"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-17T19:27:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-17T20:15:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThere are multiple server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in the DragonFly2 system. The vulnerabilities enable users to force DragonFly2\u2019s components to make requests to internal services, which otherwise are not accessible to the users.\nOne SSRF attack vector is exposed by the Manager\u2019s API. The API allows users to create jobs. When creating a Preheat type of a job, users provide a URL that the Manager connects to (see figures 2.1\u20132.3). The URL is weakly validated, and so users can trick the Manager into sending HTTP requests to services that are in the Manager\u2019s local network.\n\n```golang\nfunc (p *preheat) CreatePreheat(ctx context.Context, schedulers []models.Scheduler,\njson types.PreheatArgs) (*internaljob.GroupJobState, error) {\n[skipped]\n url := json.URL\n[skipped]\n // Generate download files\n var files []internaljob.PreheatRequest\n switch PreheatType(json.Type) {\n case PreheatImageType:\n // Parse image manifest url\nskipped, err := parseAccessURL(url) [skipped]\n[skipped]\ncase PreheatFileType: [skipped]\n}\n```\n\nA second attack vector is in peer-to-peer communication. A peer can ask another peer to make a request to an arbitrary URL by triggering the pieceManager.DownloadSource method (figure 2.4), which calls the httpSourceClient.GetMetadata method, which performs the request.\n\nAnother attack vector is due to the fact that HTTP clients used by the DragonFly2\u2019s components do not disable support for HTTP redirects. This configuration means that an HTTP request sent to a malicious server may be redirected by the server to a component\u2019s internal service.\n\n### Patches\n- Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading.\n\n### References\n\nA third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/main/docs/security/dragonfly-comprehensive-report-2023.pdf).\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [dragonfly-maintainers@googlegroups.com](mailto:dragonfly-maintainers@googlegroups.com).",
"id": "GHSA-g2rq-jv54-wcpr",
"modified": "2025-09-26T16:16:15Z",
"published": "2025-09-17T19:27:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/security/advisories/GHSA-g2rq-jv54-wcpr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59346"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/main/docs/security/dragonfly-comprehensive-report-2023.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3968"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Dragonfly vulnerable to server-side request forgery"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.