GHSA-G6RR-FV4F-CC2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/msm: Unwind probe state on registration failure
msm_iommu_probe() adds its devm-managed IOMMU object to qcom_iommu_devices before adding the IOMMU sysfs device and registering it with the IOMMU core.
If iommu_device_sysfs_add() fails, probe returns with the object still on qcom_iommu_devices. The driver core then releases the devm allocation, leaving a dangling list entry that later list walks may dereference.
If iommu_device_register() fails, the same dangling list entry remains and the sysfs device is left registered as well.
Unwind the sysfs device and global list entry in reverse setup order on the corresponding failure paths.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89452"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/msm: Unwind probe state on registration failure\n\nmsm_iommu_probe() adds its devm-managed IOMMU object to\nqcom_iommu_devices before adding the IOMMU sysfs device and registering\nit with the IOMMU core.\n\nIf iommu_device_sysfs_add() fails, probe returns with the object still on\nqcom_iommu_devices. The driver core then releases the devm allocation,\nleaving a dangling list entry that later list walks may dereference.\n\nIf iommu_device_register() fails, the same dangling list entry remains\nand the sysfs device is left registered as well.\n\nUnwind the sysfs device and global list entry in reverse setup order on\nthe corresponding failure paths.",
"id": "GHSA-g6rr-fv4f-cc2j",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89452"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/535a200220ca2c83bc8bf54bd2cbe045d6ee70c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f7074a886c4a93e3d12076ce60a510a1ebe400c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f532401be9312ecd166f616bb74a65b0b4c150fa"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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