GHSA-G8PP-85Q4-6CGQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 06:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

block: recompute nr_integrity_segments in blk_insert_cloned_request

blk_insert_cloned_request() already recomputes nr_phys_segments against the bottom queue, because "the queue settings related to segment counting may differ from the original queue." The exact same reasoning applies to integrity segments: a stacked driver's underlying queue can have tighter virt_boundary_mask, seg_boundary_mask, or max_segment_size than the top queue, in which case blk_rq_count_integrity_sg() against the bottom queue produces a different count than the cached rq->nr_integrity_segments inherited from the source request by blk_rq_prep_clone().

When the cached count is lower than the bottom queue's actual count, blk_rq_map_integrity_sg() trips

BUG_ON(segments > rq->nr_integrity_segments);

on dispatch. The same families of stacked setups that motivated the existing nr_phys_segments recompute -- dm-multipath fanning out to nvme-rdma in particular -- can produce this.

Mirror the nr_phys_segments handling: when the request carries integrity, recompute nr_integrity_segments against the bottom queue and reject the request if it exceeds the bottom queue's max_integrity_segments. blk_rq_count_integrity_sg() and queue_max_integrity_segments() are both already available via , which blk-mq.c includes.

This closes a latent gap in the stacking contract and brings the integrity-segment accounting in line with the existing phys-segment accounting.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64232"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-24T16:16:52Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nblock: recompute nr_integrity_segments in blk_insert_cloned_request\n\nblk_insert_cloned_request() already recomputes nr_phys_segments\nagainst the bottom queue, because \"the queue settings related to\nsegment counting may differ from the original queue.\" The exact same\nreasoning applies to integrity segments: a stacked driver\u0027s underlying\nqueue can have tighter virt_boundary_mask, seg_boundary_mask, or\nmax_segment_size than the top queue, in which case\nblk_rq_count_integrity_sg() against the bottom queue produces a\ndifferent count than the cached rq-\u003enr_integrity_segments inherited\nfrom the source request by blk_rq_prep_clone().\n\nWhen the cached count is lower than the bottom queue\u0027s actual count,\nblk_rq_map_integrity_sg() trips\n\n\tBUG_ON(segments \u003e rq-\u003enr_integrity_segments);\n\non dispatch. The same families of stacked setups that motivated the\nexisting nr_phys_segments recompute -- dm-multipath fanning out to\nnvme-rdma in particular -- can produce this.\n\nMirror the nr_phys_segments handling: when the request carries\nintegrity, recompute nr_integrity_segments against the bottom queue\nand reject the request if it exceeds the bottom queue\u0027s\nmax_integrity_segments. blk_rq_count_integrity_sg() and\nqueue_max_integrity_segments() are both already available via\n\u003clinux/blk-integrity.h\u003e, which blk-mq.c includes.\n\nThis closes a latent gap in the stacking contract and brings the\nintegrity-segment accounting in line with the existing\nphys-segment accounting.",
  "id": "GHSA-g8pp-85q4-6cgq",
  "modified": "2026-07-27T06:30:30Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T18:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64232"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0943f81e1b3176f27dbaf6db268fc69d8a94f0ba"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c6e6a18a37b905cb584eb0dda3ae482162a81ca"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42929c98d044f126508baf54a65b0f87f932fa75"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53a01bcc0242590eda4c452a5bd996f62457113b"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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