ghsa-g9v2-wqcj-j99g
Vulnerability from github
Summary
Attackers with access to a users' device can gain persistent account access. This is caused by missing verification of Session Tokens after password changes and/or elapsed inactivity-periods.
Details
uptime-kuma sets JWT tokens for users after successful authentication.
These tokens have the following design flaws:
- After successful login, a JWT token and it is stored in sessionStorage or localStorage.
Which of the two is decided based on the Remember Me button.
The users' token is valid without any time limitation, even after long periods of inactivity.
This increases the risk of session hijacking if, for example, a user forgets to log off and leaves the PC.
- sessions are only deleted on the client side after a user loggs out, meaning a local attacker could reuse said token with deep system access over the browser
- If a user changes a password
- any previously logged in clients are not logged out
- previously issued tokens remained valid forever
These flaws allow user cookies to remain valid even after changing passwords or being inactive, posing a high security risk.
POC
Password resets not deactivating cookies
- Log in.
- Note the user cookie.
- Change your password.
- Attempt to log in again with the same cookie.
- The cookie remains valid despite the password change.
Inactivity not deactivating sessions
In testing, even after a period of over a day of inactivity, the session was still valid
Impact
Another person with local access to the device could take over the session permanently, even after hours of previous inactivity or a password change. Such activity would not be obvious to the user (see https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/issues/3481 if you want to help with this).
With this gained account access, an attacker can cause:
confidentially loss
- monitors (including private ones not shared on public status pages)
- notification providers
- settings like
api-keys(only used for accessing/metrics) - settings like secrets like the
Steam API Key - maintenance periods
availability loss
- by creating a lot of monitors and setting the retention policy very high leading to degraded database performance or out of storage
- by creating a lot of
HTTP(s) - Browser Engine (Chrome/Chromium) (Beta)leading to RAM exhaustion
integrity loss
- by the attacker deleting a monitor
- by the attacker deleting a monitor's history
- by the atacker changing the meaning of a monitor (changing where it points)
scope creep
If operated in some restricted network, access to monitors may provide the ability to change the scope of the attack to a different piece of infrastructure, for example via SQL commands to a database server.
We have not classified this as changed scope because credentials stored in the application for accessing other systems are existing valid paths across the trust boundary, and the user should be aware of that.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "uptime-kuma"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.23.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-44400"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-384"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-10T21:29:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-09T16:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Summary\n\nAttackers with access to a users\u0027 device can gain persistent account access.\nThis is caused by missing verification of Session Tokens after password changes and/or elapsed inactivity-periods.\n\n# Details\n\n`uptime-kuma` sets JWT tokens for users after successful authentication.\n\nThese tokens have the following design flaws:\n- After successful login, a JWT token and it is stored in `sessionStorage` or `localStorage`. \n Which of the two is decided based on the `Remember Me` button. \n The users\u0027 token is valid without any time limitation, even after long periods of inactivity. \n This increases the risk of session hijacking if, for example, a user forgets to log off and leaves the PC.\n- sessions are only deleted on the client side after a user loggs out, meaning a local attacker could reuse said token with deep system access over the browser\n- If a user changes a password\n - any previously logged in clients are not logged out\n - previously issued tokens remained valid forever\n\nThese flaws allow user cookies to remain valid even after changing passwords or being inactive, posing a high security risk.\n\n# POC\n### Password resets not deactivating cookies\n- Log in.\n- Note the user cookie.\n- Change your password.\n- Attempt to log in again with the same cookie.\n- The cookie remains valid despite the password change.\n\n### Inactivity not deactivating sessions\n In testing, even after a period of over a day of inactivity, the session was still valid\n\n# Impact\n\nAnother person with local access to the device could take over the session permanently, even after hours of previous inactivity or a password change.\nSuch activity would not be obvious to the user (see https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/issues/3481 if you want to help with this).\n\nWith this gained account access, an attacker can cause:\n\n## confidentially loss\n- monitors (including private ones not shared on public status pages)\n- notification providers \n- settings like `api-keys` (only used for accessing `/metrics`)\n- settings like secrets like the `Steam API Key`\n- maintenance periods\n\n## availability loss \n\n- by creating a lot of monitors and setting the retention policy very high leading to degraded database performance or out of storage\n- by creating a lot of `HTTP(s) - Browser Engine (Chrome/Chromium) (Beta)` leading to RAM exhaustion\n\n## integrity loss\n- by the attacker deleting a monitor\n- by the attacker deleting a monitor\u0027s history\n- by the atacker changing the meaning of a monitor (changing where it points)\n\n## scope creep\nIf operated in some restricted network, access to monitors may provide the ability to change the scope of the attack to a different piece of infrastructure, for example via SQL commands to a database server.\nWe have not classified this as `changed scope` because credentials stored in the application for accessing other systems are existing valid paths across the trust boundary, and the user should be aware of that.",
"id": "GHSA-g9v2-wqcj-j99g",
"modified": "2023-10-13T22:04:34Z",
"published": "2023-10-10T21:29:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/security/advisories/GHSA-g9v2-wqcj-j99g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-44400"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/issues/3481"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/commit/88afab6571ef7d4d41bb395cdb6ecd3968835a4a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Uptime Kuma has Persistentent User Sessions"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.