GHSA-G9X6-C54R-8JG6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-09 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/sched: Fix deadlock in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb
The Mesa issue referenced below pointed out a possible deadlock:
[ 1231.611031] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1231.611033] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1231.611034] ---- ---- [ 1231.611035] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17); [ 1231.611038] local_irq_disable(); [ 1231.611039] lock(&fence->lock); [ 1231.611041] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17); [ 1231.611044] [ 1231.611045] lock(&fence->lock); [ 1231.611047] *** DEADLOCK ***
In this example, CPU0 would be any function accessing job->dependencies through the xa_* functions that don't disable interrupts (eg: drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()).
CPU1 is executing drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() as a fence signalling callback so in an interrupt context. It will deadlock when trying to grab the xa_lock which is already held by CPU0.
Replacing all xa_ usage by their xa__irq counterparts would fix this issue, but Christian pointed out another issue: dma_fence_signal takes fence.lock and so does dma_fence_add_callback.
dma_fence_signal() // locks f1.lock -> drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() -> foreach dependencies -> dma_fence_add_callback() // locks f2.lock
This will deadlock if f1 and f2 share the same spinlock.
To fix both issues, the code iterating on dependencies and re-arming them is moved out to drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work().
[phasta: commit message nits]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-40329"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:17:43Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/sched: Fix deadlock in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb\n\nThe Mesa issue referenced below pointed out a possible deadlock:\n\n[ 1231.611031] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:\n\n[ 1231.611033] CPU0 CPU1\n[ 1231.611034] ---- ----\n[ 1231.611035] lock(\u0026xa-\u003exa_lock#17);\n[ 1231.611038] local_irq_disable();\n[ 1231.611039] lock(\u0026fence-\u003elock);\n[ 1231.611041] lock(\u0026xa-\u003exa_lock#17);\n[ 1231.611044] \u003cInterrupt\u003e\n[ 1231.611045] lock(\u0026fence-\u003elock);\n[ 1231.611047]\n *** DEADLOCK ***\n\nIn this example, CPU0 would be any function accessing job-\u003edependencies\nthrough the xa_* functions that don\u0027t disable interrupts (eg:\ndrm_sched_job_add_dependency(), drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()).\n\nCPU1 is executing drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() as a fence signalling\ncallback so in an interrupt context. It will deadlock when trying to\ngrab the xa_lock which is already held by CPU0.\n\nReplacing all xa_* usage by their xa_*_irq counterparts would fix\nthis issue, but Christian pointed out another issue: dma_fence_signal\ntakes fence.lock and so does dma_fence_add_callback.\n\n dma_fence_signal() // locks f1.lock\n -\u003e drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()\n -\u003e foreach dependencies\n -\u003e dma_fence_add_callback() // locks f2.lock\n\nThis will deadlock if f1 and f2 share the same spinlock.\n\nTo fix both issues, the code iterating on dependencies and re-arming them\nis moved out to drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work().\n\n[phasta: commit message nits]",
"id": "GHSA-g9x6-c54r-8jg6",
"modified": "2025-12-09T18:30:35Z",
"published": "2025-12-09T18:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40329"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d63031ee4a57be0252cb9a4e09ae921c75cece9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e8ada4fd838e3fd2cca94000dac054f3a347c01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/487df8b698345dd5a91346335f05170ed5f29d4e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70150b9443dddf02157d821c68abf438f55a2e8e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
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