GHSA-GCR2-9V8M-GQ45
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 22:44 – Updated: 2026-09-02 22:44Summary
@dicebear/core builds avatar SVGs from caller-supplied options. The numeric rotate option is interpolated into an SVG transform attribute without XML-escaping. It is typed as a number, but nothing checks the type at runtime, so a string value passes straight through and can break out of the attribute to inject arbitrary SVG markup.
This is the same root cause as CVE-2026-33311 (GHSA-mr9r-mww3-v6gv), which escaped the string options backgroundColor, fontFamily, and textColor but did not cover rotate. @dicebear/initials has the same gap in its numeric fontSize and fontWeight options.
Impact
Cross-site scripting (CWE-79). When the generated avatar is rendered inline (for example via innerHTML) or served as image/svg+xml and opened directly, injected markup such as an <image onerror> handler runs script in the page's origin.
Exploitation requires the application to pass untrusted input into one of these options:
rotate(@dicebear/core)fontSize,fontWeight(@dicebear/initials)
In most integrations these options are set by the developer and only seed is user-controlled, so the vulnerable configuration is uncommon. Applications that use trusted, hardcoded values for these options are not at risk.
Patches
Fixed in @dicebear/core 9.4.3 and @dicebear/initials 9.4.3: the values are now XML-escaped before being written into the SVG, matching the CVE-2026-33311 fix. Upgrade to 9.4.3 or later.
The 5.x through 8.x lines share the same flaw but are end-of-life and will not receive a backport; upgrade to 9.4.3. The 10.x line is not affected.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, coerce the affected options to a number before passing them to createAvatar:
rotate: Number(userInput) || 0,
Credits
Reported by @rz1027.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.4.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@dicebear/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.4.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@dicebear/initials"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79",
"CWE-184"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T22:44:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T21:17:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`@dicebear/core` builds avatar SVGs from caller-supplied options. The numeric `rotate` option is interpolated into an SVG `transform` attribute without XML-escaping. It is typed as a number, but nothing checks the type at runtime, so a string value passes straight through and can break out of the attribute to inject arbitrary SVG markup.\n\nThis is the same root cause as CVE-2026-33311 (GHSA-mr9r-mww3-v6gv), which escaped the string options `backgroundColor`, `fontFamily`, and `textColor` but did not cover `rotate`. `@dicebear/initials` has the same gap in its numeric `fontSize` and `fontWeight` options.\n\n## Impact\n\nCross-site scripting (CWE-79). When the generated avatar is rendered inline (for example via `innerHTML`) or served as `image/svg+xml` and opened directly, injected markup such as an `\u003cimage onerror\u003e` handler runs script in the page\u0027s origin.\n\nExploitation requires the application to pass untrusted input into one of these options:\n\n- `rotate` (`@dicebear/core`)\n- `fontSize`, `fontWeight` (`@dicebear/initials`)\n\nIn most integrations these options are set by the developer and only `seed` is user-controlled, so the vulnerable configuration is uncommon. Applications that use trusted, hardcoded values for these options are not at risk.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@dicebear/core` 9.4.3 and `@dicebear/initials` 9.4.3: the values are now XML-escaped before being written into the SVG, matching the CVE-2026-33311 fix. Upgrade to 9.4.3 or later.\n\nThe 5.x through 8.x lines share the same flaw but are end-of-life and will not receive a backport; upgrade to 9.4.3. The 10.x line is not affected.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade, coerce the affected options to a number before passing them to `createAvatar`:\n\n```js\nrotate: Number(userInput) || 0,\n```\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by @rz1027.",
"id": "GHSA-gcr2-9v8m-gq45",
"modified": "2026-09-02T22:44:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T22:44:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear/security/advisories/GHSA-gcr2-9v8m-gq45"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear/commit/922946d738c4e77ab6c412e27ede75941fec4b59"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear/releases/tag/v9.4.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DiceBear: SVG injection via the unescaped rotate option in @dicebear/core (and fontSize/fontWeight in @dicebear/initials)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.