GHSA-GFMM-7QWJ-299M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate dirty page table on log replay
Each DIR_PAGE_ENTRY ends in a page_lcns[] array whose length is the on-disk lcns_follow field. check_rstbl() validates the table bookkeeping but never checks that this array fits in the entry, so a crafted lcns_follow lets the v0->v1 conversion memmove and later replay passes run off the entry.
Add check_dp_table() to reject, right after check_rstbl(), any entry larger than its size claims via struct_size() (the same expression used to allocate these entries, so the check is overflow-safe by construction). All consumers can then trust lcns_follow as the real capacity. This covers every page_lcns[] access whose index is bounded by the entry itself (the conversion memmove, the HotFix store via find_dp(), and the self-bounded scan loops). Accesses whose index comes from the log record need a separate bound and are handled in a follow-up patch.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89617"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs/ntfs3: validate dirty page table on log replay\n\nEach DIR_PAGE_ENTRY ends in a page_lcns[] array whose length is the on-disk\nlcns_follow field. check_rstbl() validates the table bookkeeping but never\nchecks that this array fits in the entry, so a crafted lcns_follow lets the\nv0-\u003ev1 conversion memmove and later replay passes run off the entry.\n\nAdd check_dp_table() to reject, right after check_rstbl(), any entry larger\nthan its size claims via struct_size() (the same expression used to allocate\nthese entries, so the check is overflow-safe by construction). All consumers\ncan then trust lcns_follow as the real capacity. This covers every\npage_lcns[] access whose index is bounded by the entry itself (the\nconversion memmove, the HotFix store via find_dp(), and the self-bounded\nscan loops). Accesses whose index comes from the log record need a separate\nbound and are handled in a follow-up patch.",
"id": "GHSA-gfmm-7qwj-299m",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:32Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89617"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/006cb7713dec10368e699abc4367e5faa334c9a5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0908da07c23be4f94b99dfd9a94765525f0fe4bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e07ea2fc45a7b4757ef7bf1f692cc0180a08323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1200c2779c43b62656ccbb67df9468a7a9af2484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e90b1703ee1a04cd3e9e399353fc536f5f3ba10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d94ffc9d7b5bb3517b129fe63b52d84bcd4ae56"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d23155634a4bc1183e761d5eb2c043b2e693cc98"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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