GHSA-GJ94-V4P9-W672

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-25 22:34 – Updated: 2025-12-26 17:29
VLAI?
Summary
Denial-of-service vulnerability processing large chat messages containing many newlines
Details

Impact

PocketMine-MP caps maximum chat message length at 512 Unicode characters, or about 2048 bytes. No more than 2 chat messages may be sent per tick. However, due to legacy reasons, incoming chat message blobs are split by \n, and each part is treated as a separate message, the length of each part is individually checked. The length of the whole message is not checked.

This leads to an exploitable performance issue, in which a malicious client may send a chat packet of several megabytes containing nothing but \n newline characters. The server will parse this into a very large array and spend a long time (several milliseconds) iterating over it for no reason.

Furthermore, due to the lack of sufficient rate limit checks before parsing messages, malicious clients may bombard the server with many thousands of these malicious messages, causing lockups for a significant amount of time (seconds or minutes).

Patches

This bug was addressed in https://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/commit/df33e179e5d3ff13b56a2d7060bf592b0f797258 by: - checking the length of the incoming message as a whole before parsing it - it may not be larger than messageCounter * maxChatMessageSize (messageCounter is decremented once for every message sent) - limiting the maximum number of times a message may be split on newlines before giving up and discarding the message (maximum 3 parts; anything after the first 2 parts is discarded)

Workarounds

Handle DataPacketReceiveEvent and check for these excessive newlines in incoming TextPacket.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at team@pmmp.io

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "pocketmine/pocketmine-mp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-05-25T22:34:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nPocketMine-MP caps maximum chat message length at 512 Unicode characters, or about 2048 bytes. No more than 2 chat messages may be sent per tick. However, due to legacy reasons, incoming chat message blobs are split by `\\n`, and each part is treated as a separate message, the length of each part is individually checked. The length of the whole message is not checked.\n\nThis leads to an exploitable performance issue, in which a malicious client may send a chat packet of several megabytes containing nothing but `\\n` newline characters. The server will parse this into a very large array and spend a long time (several milliseconds) iterating over it for no reason.\n\nFurthermore, due to the lack of sufficient rate limit checks before parsing messages, malicious clients may bombard the server with many thousands of these malicious messages, causing lockups for a significant amount of time (seconds or minutes).\n\n### Patches\nThis bug was addressed in https://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/commit/df33e179e5d3ff13b56a2d7060bf592b0f797258 by:\n- checking the length of the incoming message as a whole before parsing it - it may not be larger than `messageCounter * maxChatMessageSize` (`messageCounter` is decremented once for every message sent)\n- limiting the maximum number of times a message may be split on newlines before giving up and discarding the message (maximum 3 parts; anything after the first 2 parts is discarded)\n\n### Workarounds\nHandle `DataPacketReceiveEvent` and check for these excessive newlines in incoming `TextPacket`.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Email us at [team@pmmp.io](mailto:team@pmmp.io)",
  "id": "GHSA-gj94-v4p9-w672",
  "modified": "2025-12-26T17:29:04Z",
  "published": "2022-05-25T22:34:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/security/advisories/GHSA-gj94-v4p9-w672"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Denial-of-service vulnerability processing large chat messages containing many newlines"
}


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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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