GHSA-GJV3-89HH-9XQ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-25 21:27 – Updated: 2025-06-25 21:28
VLAI?
Summary
RISC Zero Ethereum invalid commitment with digest value of zero accepted by Steel.validateCommitment
Details

Impact

Prior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the Steel.validateCommitment Solidity library function will return true for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero.

This violates the semantics of validateCommitment, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs (e.g. having the guest commit to a digest of zero, or failing to check the zkVM proof).

Because this bug does not risk application integrity, correctly written applications are not at risk.

Fix

Please see #605 for a full description of the bug, and the fix. This fix has been released as part of risc0-ethereum 2.1.1 and 2.2.0.

Recommended actions

Users for the Steel Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using Steel.validateCommitment in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the ERC-20 counter example, and documentation. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action.

Users not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.

Credit

A thank you to Daniel526 on HackenProof for reporting this issue

Severity ?
1.7 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "risc0-ethereum-contracts"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-52884"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-159"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-25T21:27:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-24T21:15:26Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nPrior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the `Steel.validateCommitment` Solidity library function will return `true` for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero.\n\nThis violates the semantics of `validateCommitment`, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs (e.g. having the guest commit to a digest of zero, or failing to check the zkVM proof).\n\nBecause this bug does not risk application integrity, correctly written applications are not at risk.\n\n### Fix\n\nPlease see [#605] for a full description of the bug, and the fix. This fix has been released as part of `risc0-ethereum` [2.1.1] and [2.2.0].\n\n### Recommended actions\n\nUsers for the `Steel` Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using `Steel.validateCommitment` in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the [ERC-20 counter example][example], and [documentation]. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action.\n\nUsers not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.\n\n### Credit\n\nA thank you to Daniel526 on HackenProof for reporting this issue\n\n[#605]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/pull/605\n[example]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/ff0cb9253a87945b653b825711b8b5075f8b7545/examples/erc20-counter/contracts/src/Counter.sol#L56-L63\n[documentation]: https://docs.beboundless.xyz/developers/steel/how-it-works#verifying-the-proof-onchain\n[2.1.1]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.1.1\n[2.2.0]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.2.0",
  "id": "GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2",
  "modified": "2025-06-25T21:28:00Z",
  "published": "2025-06-25T21:27:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52884"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/pull/605"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/commit/3bbac859c7132b21ba5fdf2d47f1dd52e7e73d98"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.beboundless.xyz/developers/steel/how-it-works#verifying-the-proof-onchain"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/ff0cb9253a87945b653b825711b8b5075f8b7545/examples/erc20-counter/contracts/src/Counter.sol#L56-L63"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.1.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RISC Zero Ethereum invalid commitment with digest value of zero accepted by Steel.validateCommitment"
}


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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



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