{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25526"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T17:52:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T22:15:59Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\n**Vulnerability Type**: Sandbox Bypass / Remote Code Execution\n\n**Affected Component**: Jinjava\n\n**Affected Users**:\n- Organizations using HubSpot\u0027s Jinjava template rendering engine for user-provided template content\n- Any system that renders untrusted Jinja templates using HubSpot\u0027s Jinjava implementation\n- Users with the ability to create or edit custom code templates\n\n**Severity**: **Critical** - allows arbitrary Java class instantiation and file access bypassing built-in sandbox restrictions\n\n**Root Cause**: Multiple security bypass vulnerabilities in Jinjava\u0027s sandbox mechanism:\n\n1. **ForTag Property Access Bypass**: The `ForTag` class does not enforce `JinjavaBeanELResolver` restrictions when iterating over object properties using `Introspector.getBeanInfo()` and invoking getter methods via `PropertyDescriptor.getReadMethod()`\n\n2. **Restricted Class Instantiation**: The sandbox\u0027s type allowlist can be bypassed by using ObjectMapper to instantiate classes through JSON deserialization, including creating new `JinjavaELContext` and `JinjavaConfig` instances\n\n**Attack Vector**: An attacker with the ability to create or edit Jinja templates can:\n- Access arbitrary getter methods on objects in the template context\n- Instantiate `ObjectMapper` to enable default typing\n- Create arbitrary Java classes by bypassing type allowlists\n- Read files from the server filesystem (demonstrated with `/etc/passwd`)\n- Potentially execute arbitrary code\n\n## Patches\n\n**Status**: Patched - CVE-2026-25526\n\nUsers should upgrade to one of the following versions which contain fixes for this vulnerability:\n\n- **JinJava 2.8.3** or later\n- **JinJava 2.7.6** or later\n\n**Fix Components**:\n\n1. **ForTag Security Hardening**\n   - Added security checks to `ForTag.renderForCollection()` to enforce `JinjavaBeanELResolver` restrictions\n   - Implemented property access validation against restricted properties/methods before invoking getter methods\n   - Added checks for restricted class types before introspection\n\n2. **Enhanced Type Validation**\n   - Improved validation in `JinjavaBeanELResolver.isRestrictedClass()` to prevent instantiation of sensitive types\n   - Added additional restricted types to the denylist\n   - Implemented deeper validation for types created via ObjectMapper deserialization\n\n3. **Configuration Protection**\n   - Added checks to prevent creation of new `JinjavaConfig` or `JinjavaELContext` instances via ObjectMapper\n   - Prevented modification of `readOnlyResolver` configuration from untrusted templates\n   - Implemented additional safeguards around ELResolver configuration\n\n4. **Collection Type Validation**\n   - Implemented proper type validation in `HubLELResolver` to prevent collection type wrapping bypasses\n   - Added checks for wrapped types in collection deserialization\n   - Implemented validation for all types within collections against allowlists\n\n5. **ObjectMapper Restrictions**\n   - Added additional restrictions on `ObjectMapper.enableDefaultTyping()` to prevent enabling via less restrictive ELResolver\n   - Ensured default typing cannot be enabled without proper authorization\n\n**Information for Users**: Upgrade to version 2.8.3 or 2.7.6 or later to address this vulnerability.\n\n## References\n\n### Project Resources\n- **Jinjava Source Code**: [github.com/HubSpot/jinjava](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava)\n- **Jinjava Releases**: [github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/releases](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/releases)\n\n### Security Standards \u0026 Classifications\n- **CWE-502**: Deserialization of Untrusted Data\n- **CWE-913**: Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources\n- **CWE-94**: Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027)\n- **CVSS v3.1**: Common Vulnerability Scoring System\n\n### Additional Resources\n- [OWASP Template Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Template_Injection)\n- [Java Deserialization Security](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n- [CVE Standards and Procedures](https://cve.mitre.org/)",
  "id": "GHSA-gjx9-j8f8-7j74",
  "modified": "2026-02-05T00:34:36Z",
  "published": "2026-02-03T17:52:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/security/advisories/GHSA-gjx9-j8f8-7j74"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25526"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/commit/3d02e504d8bbb13bf3fe019e9ca7b51dfce7a998"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/commit/c7328dce6030ac718f88974196035edafef24441"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/releases/tag/jinjava-2.7.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/releases/tag/jinjava-2.8.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "JinJava Bypass through ForTag leads to Arbitrary Java Execution"
}