GHSA-GMJ3-5XFG-Q3QG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-17 21:31Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send.
Both default emails emit a link of the form $base/login/$code, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy (obtained from Dancer2's request->base function). A POST to /login carrying submit_reset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender's choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls create_user with email_welcome set.
Through 0.711 the handlers read request->uri_base and request->base directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uri_base configuration key that defaults to the untrusted request->uri_base when unset.
The default configuration with reset_password_handler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender's host, which is enough to take over the account.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-640"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T14:17:06Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send.\n\nBoth default emails emit a link of the form `$base/login/$code`, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy (obtained from Dancer2\u0027s request-\u003ebase function). A POST to /login carrying submit_reset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender\u0027s choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls create_user with email_welcome set.\n\nThrough 0.711 the handlers read `request-\u003euri_base` and `request-\u003ebase` directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uri_base configuration key that defaults to the untrusted `request-\u003euri_base` when unset.\n\nThe default configuration with reset_password_handler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender\u0027s host, which is enough to take over the account.",
"id": "GHSA-gmj3-5xfg-q3qg",
"modified": "2026-08-17T21:31:18Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T15:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.711/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L1031-1053"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.711/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L1097-1121"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.712/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L178-194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.713/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.713/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L178-196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/15/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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