GHSA-GP6V-H5QC-H9V5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack()
The stop value is derived from bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable is an unsigned long. If bprm->p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes zero the loop condition index >= stop is always true.
After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and bprm->page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array. The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn't terminate either...
Getting there only requires bprm->p < PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only constraint on how far bprm->p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e. that each individual string still fits in what is left.
bprm->p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves it in the first page:
Oops - load access fault [#1] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1 epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000 status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005 [<801a5324>] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 [<800d5f6a>] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e [<800a2de4>] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316 [<800a351a>] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138 [<800a3d44>] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
This is an arcane bug but we should still fix it.
Count down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop, stop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every other value of stop.
Only CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used by binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only.
The loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434 ("elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic") only moved it from binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used part of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged from 2.6.12-rc2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68187"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:05Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nexec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack()\n\nThe stop value is derived from bprm-\u003ep \u003e\u003e PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable\nis an unsigned long. If bprm-\u003ep drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes\nzero the loop condition index \u003e= stop is always true.\n\nAfter the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and\nbprm-\u003epage[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array.\nThe pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to\nkmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that\nlands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn\u0027t\nterminate either...\n\nGetting there only requires bprm-\u003ep \u003c PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU\nbprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only\nconstraint on how far bprm-\u003ep is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e.\nthat each individual string still fits in what is left.\n\nbprm-\u003ep starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a\nsingle argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves\nit in the first page:\n\n Oops - load access fault [#1]\n CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1\n epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8\n ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae\n s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000\n a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000\n status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005\n [\u003c801a5324\u003e] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8\n [\u003c800d5f6a\u003e] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e\n [\u003c800a2de4\u003e] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316\n [\u003c800a351a\u003e] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138\n [\u003c800a3d44\u003e] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt\n\nThis is an arcane bug but we should still fix it.\n\nCount down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop,\nstop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every\nother value of stop.\n\nOnly CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used\nby binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only.\n\nThe loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434\n(\"elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic\") only moved it\nfrom binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used\npart of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged\nfrom 2.6.12-rc2.",
"id": "GHSA-gp6v-h5qc-h9v5",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68187"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16cc4f5c1c4b9e45eca7f7deefa5410a292db599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2bc6bf70d41055377f390d06f0f3521deb62fd3b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55fa2c7f2b15583d1a2fe1b5abcc24377359339f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66e20942890a383eb39b2009a2ceb4c2ebec37ef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67cf5cdad823afb0530d6d0341fbf4ca07e93a09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9eb5c4949008034909bc34ecfa0843ecc1d0ab3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c62bb00caba66e01fb578d5f0302f247dc64930a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfc2a00742af4cb7251c1a8fbce4fbae3cc0de4e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.