GHSA-GV5W-HFX8-8CWQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 23:42 – Updated: 2026-09-02 23:42Impact
When a filer JWT restricts a token to a set of path prefixes via allowed_prefixes, the authorization check used a literal byte-prefix match (strings.HasPrefix). A token scoped to /tenant1 therefore also authorized requests to sibling paths such as /tenant1234, /tenant1-old, and /tenant1backup.
In a multi-tenant deployment this lets the holder of one tenant's token access another tenant's data. Because allowed_prefixes gates both read and write tokens, the impact covers cross-tenant reads and writes. A valid scoped token is required, so this is an authorization bypass rather than a fully unauthenticated flaw.
Affected component
weed/server/filer_server_handlers.go(JWTallowed_prefixesauthorization check)
Patches
Fixed in 4.24. The check now matches on /-separated path components after path.Clean normalisation, so /tenant1 authorizes only /tenant1 and its descendants — not /tenant1234 or other sibling paths.
Workarounds
Where feasible, choose prefix names that are not string-prefixes of one another (e.g. keep a trailing separator convention). Upgrade to 4.24.
References
- Reported by Kadir Arslan (https://github.com/KadirArslan)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260512171048-05ed5c9ae8a2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T23:42:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T15:17:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nWhen a filer JWT restricts a token to a set of path prefixes via `allowed_prefixes`, the authorization check used a literal byte-prefix match (`strings.HasPrefix`). A token scoped to `/tenant1` therefore also authorized requests to sibling paths such as `/tenant1234`, `/tenant1-old`, and `/tenant1backup`.\n\nIn a multi-tenant deployment this lets the holder of one tenant\u0027s token access another tenant\u0027s data. Because `allowed_prefixes` gates both read and write tokens, the impact covers cross-tenant reads and writes. A valid scoped token is required, so this is an authorization bypass rather than a fully unauthenticated flaw.\n\n### Affected component\n- `weed/server/filer_server_handlers.go` (JWT `allowed_prefixes` authorization check)\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **4.24**. The check now matches on `/`-separated path components after `path.Clean` normalisation, so `/tenant1` authorizes only `/tenant1` and its descendants \u2014 not `/tenant1234` or other sibling paths.\n\n### Workarounds\nWhere feasible, choose prefix names that are not string-prefixes of one another (e.g. keep a trailing separator convention). Upgrade to 4.24.\n\n### References\n- Reported by Kadir Arslan (https://github.com/KadirArslan)",
"id": "GHSA-gv5w-hfx8-8cwq",
"modified": "2026-09-02T23:42:05Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T23:42:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-gv5w-hfx8-8cwq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/pull/9439"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/commit/05ed5c9ae8a2a45101b52b61d02f170d20d587ff"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/releases/tag/4.24"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SeaweedFS: Filer JWT allowed_prefixes literal prefix match allows cross-tenant access to sibling paths"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.