GHSA-GWJ5-WP6R-5Q9F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-11 18:08 – Updated: 2022-08-11 18:08
VLAI
Summary
Cronos vulnerable to DoS through unintended Contract Selfdestruct
Details

In Cronos nodes running versions before v0.7.0, the contract selfdestruct invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in Ethermint, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same CodeHash) will also stop working once one contract invokes selfdestruct, even though the other contracts did not invoke the selfdestruct OPCODE. Thanks to the successfully coordinated security vulnerability disclosure, no smart contracts were impacted through the use of this vulnerability. Smart contract states and storage values are not affected by this vulnerability. This problem has been patched in Cronos v0.8.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes and the required coordinated network upgrade was done on the block height 3982500 on the Cronos mainnet beta network. If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e with identical bytecode, so that the original contract's code is recovered.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-668"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-11T18:08:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Cronos nodes running versions before v0.7.0, the contract selfdestruct invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in Ethermint, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same CodeHash) will also stop working once one contract invokes selfdestruct, even though the other contracts did not invoke the selfdestruct OPCODE. Thanks to the successfully coordinated security vulnerability disclosure, no smart contracts were impacted through the use of this vulnerability. Smart contract states and storage values are not affected by this vulnerability. This problem has been patched in Cronos v0.8.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes and the required coordinated network upgrade was done on the block height 3982500 on the Cronos mainnet beta network. If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e with identical bytecode, so that the original contract\u0027s code is recovered.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-gwj5-wp6r-5q9f",
  "modified": "2022-08-11T18:08:57Z",
  "published": "2022-08-11T18:08:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos/security/advisories/GHSA-gwj5-wp6r-5q9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35936"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos/commit/2f2cc88b501b47149690fdef05afbbbe5bc116c9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Cronos vulnerable to DoS through unintended Contract Selfdestruct"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…