GHSA-H282-RVGQ-85QJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-01 06:31 – Updated: 2026-10-01 06:31The AI Engine – The Chatbot, AI Framework & MCP for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to, and including, 3.8.0 This is due to a chain of missing input neutralization and output escaping across the /mwai-ui/v1/chats/submit REST endpoint, the PHP error-log parser (MeowKit_MWAI_Helpers::php_error_logs), the Advisor task (Meow_MWAI_Modules_Advisor::run_advisor), and the Advisor dashboard widget (advisor_metabox): the server-parameter denylist in chat_submit strips only exact key names such as 'model' while convert_keys() later canonicalizes 'model_' back to 'model', allowing an unauthenticated caller to place an attacker-controlled string (including CR/LF) into $query->model; final_checks() throws an Exception whose message embeds that raw string, and the non-streaming, non-admin catch branch writes it to the PHP error log unmodified — creating a forged log line that the plugin's own parser subsequently returns as recent PHP-error content; run_advisor() then appends that content verbatim to the AI prompt (indirect prompt injection — CWE-1427), the returned JSON is stored in the mwai_advisor_data option with no schema validation or HTML sanitization, and advisor_metabox() concatenates the resulting 'title' and 'description' values directly into the WordPress dashboard widget without esc_html(), wp_kses(), or equivalent escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever an administrator accesses the WordPress dashboard.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-96561"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-01T04:18:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The AI Engine \u2013 The Chatbot, AI Framework \u0026 MCP for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to, and including, 3.8.0 This is due to a chain of missing input neutralization and output escaping across the /mwai-ui/v1/chats/submit REST endpoint, the PHP error-log parser (MeowKit_MWAI_Helpers::php_error_logs), the Advisor task (Meow_MWAI_Modules_Advisor::run_advisor), and the Advisor dashboard widget (advisor_metabox): the server-parameter denylist in chat_submit strips only exact key names such as \u0027model\u0027 while convert_keys() later canonicalizes \u0027model_\u0027 back to \u0027model\u0027, allowing an unauthenticated caller to place an attacker-controlled string (including CR/LF) into $query-\u003emodel; final_checks() throws an Exception whose message embeds that raw string, and the non-streaming, non-admin catch branch writes it to the PHP error log unmodified \u2014 creating a forged log line that the plugin\u0027s own parser subsequently returns as recent PHP-error content; run_advisor() then appends that content verbatim to the AI prompt (indirect prompt injection \u2014 CWE-1427), the returned JSON is stored in the mwai_advisor_data option with no schema validation or HTML sanitization, and advisor_metabox() concatenates the resulting \u0027title\u0027 and \u0027description\u0027 values directly into the WordPress dashboard widget without esc_html(), wp_kses(), or equivalent escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever an administrator accesses the WordPress dashboard.",
"id": "GHSA-h282-rvgq-85qj",
"modified": "2026-10-01T06:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T06:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96561"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/classes/engines/core.php#L533"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/classes/modules/advisor.php#L156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/classes/modules/advisor.php#L162"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/classes/modules/advisor.php#L216"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/classes/modules/chatbot.php#L122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/classes/modules/chatbot.php#L299"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/classes/modules/chatbot.php#L597"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/classes/query/base.php#L360"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/classes/rest.php#L464"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-engine/tags/3.8.0/common/helpers.php#L251"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=%2Fai-engine%2Ftags%2F3.8.0\u0026new_path=%2Fai-engine%2Ftags%2F3.8.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/910e51da-6ee2-45d5-837b-7fea80f79390?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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