GHSA-H2RC-2F34-85J8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: use the DMA API for resource backing on Xen
On a Xen PV domain page addresses bear no relation to the real machine addresses the host would have to use to reach it. virtio_ring.c handles this correctly, vring_use_map_api() returns true for any xen_domain() regardless of VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
virtio-gpu makes the same decision independently, but its copy looks only at the feature bit:
bool use_dma_api = !virtio_has_dma_quirk(vgdev->vdev);
QEMU does not set iommu_platform on virtio-vga by default, so VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is not negotiated, use_dma_api is false, and virtio_gpu_object_shmem_init() describes the framebuffer's backing pages to the host with sg_phys(). Those are guest-physical addresses. In a PV domain they resolve, on the host side, to pages belonging to some other domain, so the host scans out unrelated memory.
Move the decision into virtio_gpu_use_dma_api() and give it the xen_domain() check, like vring_use_map_api() has. This additionally enables the dma_sync_sgtable_for_device() calls in virtgpu_vq.c, which are required for correctness whenever swiotlb is in play.
Reproduced with a Xen 4.21 PV dom0 nested inside QEMU 8.2 with virtio-vga, on both a distro 6.8 kernel and 6.18 LTS. A PVH dom0 works fine and doesn't need this fix because it is identity-mapped, only PV dom0s are affected.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98156"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/virtio: use the DMA API for resource backing on Xen\n\nOn a Xen PV domain page addresses bear no relation to the real machine\naddresses the host would have to use to reach it.\nvirtio_ring.c handles this correctly, vring_use_map_api() returns true\nfor any xen_domain() regardless of VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.\n\nvirtio-gpu makes the same decision independently, but its copy\nlooks only at the feature bit:\n\n\tbool use_dma_api = !virtio_has_dma_quirk(vgdev-\u003evdev);\n\nQEMU does not set iommu_platform on virtio-vga by default, so\nVIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is not negotiated, use_dma_api is false, and\nvirtio_gpu_object_shmem_init() describes the framebuffer\u0027s backing pages\nto the host with sg_phys(). Those are guest-physical addresses. In a PV\ndomain they resolve, on the host side, to pages belonging to some other\ndomain, so the host scans out unrelated memory.\n\nMove the decision into virtio_gpu_use_dma_api() and give it the\nxen_domain() check, like vring_use_map_api() has. This\nadditionally enables the dma_sync_sgtable_for_device() calls in\nvirtgpu_vq.c, which are required for correctness whenever swiotlb\nis in play.\n\nReproduced with a Xen 4.21 PV dom0 nested inside QEMU 8.2 with\nvirtio-vga, on both a distro 6.8 kernel and 6.18 LTS. A PVH dom0\nworks fine and doesn\u0027t need this fix because it is identity-mapped,\nonly PV dom0s are affected.",
"id": "GHSA-h2rc-2f34-85j8",
"modified": "2026-09-25T15:31:45Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/455184dbe9652d01470d3c5cf5edd09a7a673a99"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a736d2f9d0c6e6217fe7532bc4c50ceca71db78"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93c557e947ef0040004b1ac6a1c1265d79a957e1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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