GHSA-H3RM-6X7G-882F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 21:19 – Updated: 2026-03-19 21:22Summary
In openclaw@2026.3.1, node system.run approval-path hardening rewrote wrapper command argv in a way that changed execution semantics. A command shown/approved as a shell payload (for example echo SAFE) could execute a different local script when wrapper argv were rewritten.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
2026.3.1(latest published npm version as of March 2, 2026) - Fixed release:
2026.3.2(released)
Technical Details
Root cause was in node-host approval hardening for system.run:
- src/node-host/invoke-system-run-plan.ts rewrote argv[0] to the resolved executable.
- Wrapper resolution unwrapped dispatch wrappers, so input like ['env','sh','-c','echo SAFE'] resolved executable sh.
- The approved plan could become ['/bin/sh','sh','-c','echo SAFE'] while approval text remained echo SAFE.
That rewrite changed runtime behavior: /bin/sh interprets the extra sh positional argument as a script path, enabling execution of a local ./sh file from approved cwd instead of the approved payload text.
Impact
Approval-integrity break in host=node execution flow: operator-visible command text and executed behavior could diverge.
Exploit preconditions: - attacker can influence wrapper argv and place a local file in approved working directory, - operator grants approval for the displayed command.
Fix Commit(s)
dded569626b0d8e7bdab10b5e7528b6caf73a0f1
Fixed Version
- Patched in
openclaw@2026.3.2.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.3.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2026.3.1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29608"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:19:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIn `openclaw@2026.3.1`, node `system.run` approval-path hardening rewrote wrapper command argv in a way that changed execution semantics. A command shown/approved as a shell payload (for example `echo SAFE`) could execute a different local script when wrapper argv were rewritten.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `2026.3.1` (latest published npm version as of March 2, 2026)\n- Fixed release: `2026.3.2` (released)\n\n### Technical Details\nRoot cause was in node-host approval hardening for `system.run`:\n- `src/node-host/invoke-system-run-plan.ts` rewrote `argv[0]` to the resolved executable.\n- Wrapper resolution unwrapped dispatch wrappers, so input like `[\u0027env\u0027,\u0027sh\u0027,\u0027-c\u0027,\u0027echo SAFE\u0027]` resolved executable `sh`.\n- The approved plan could become `[\u0027/bin/sh\u0027,\u0027sh\u0027,\u0027-c\u0027,\u0027echo SAFE\u0027]` while approval text remained `echo SAFE`.\n\nThat rewrite changed runtime behavior: `/bin/sh` interprets the extra `sh` positional argument as a script path, enabling execution of a local `./sh` file from approved `cwd` instead of the approved payload text.\n\n### Impact\nApproval-integrity break in `host=node` execution flow: operator-visible command text and executed behavior could diverge.\n\nExploit preconditions:\n- attacker can influence wrapper argv and place a local file in approved working directory,\n- operator grants approval for the displayed command.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `dded569626b0d8e7bdab10b5e7528b6caf73a0f1`\n\n### Fixed Version\n- Patched in `openclaw@2026.3.2`.",
"id": "GHSA-h3rm-6x7g-882f",
"modified": "2026-03-19T21:22:05Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T21:19:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-h3rm-6x7g-882f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29608"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/dded569626b0d8e7bdab10b5e7528b6caf73a0f1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-approval-integrity-bypass-via-system-run-argv-rewriting"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s Node system.run approval hardening wrapper semantic drift can execute unintended local scripts"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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