GHSA-H5X4-M2QF-R4F2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 18:08 – Updated: 2026-05-05 18:08Diesel uses the sqlite3_value_text function to receive strings from SQLite while deserializing query results. We misinterpreted the corresponding SQLite documentation that this function always returns a UTF-8 encoded string values as *const c_char. Based on that we used str::from_utf8_unchecked to construct a Rust string slice without any additional UTF-8 checks in place. It turned out that this function doesn't always return correct UTF-8 strings. For field of the SQLite side storage type BLOB this pointer can contain arbitrary bytes, which makes the usage of str::from_utf8_unchecked unsound as this violates the safety contract of str to only contain valid UTF-8 encoded Strings.
Mitigation
The preferred mitigation to the outlined problem is to update to a Diesel version 2.3.8 or newer, which includes fixes for the problem.
Resolution
Diesel now correctly checks whether the provides byte buffer is actually valid UTF-8, instead of relying on SQLite's documentation. This fix is included in the 2.3.8 release.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "diesel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T18:08:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Diesel uses the `sqlite3_value_text` function to receive strings from SQLite while deserializing query results. We misinterpreted the corresponding [SQLite](https://sqlite.org/c3ref/value_blob.html) documentation that this function always returns a UTF-8 encoded string values as `*const c_char`. Based on that we used `str::from_utf8_unchecked` to construct a Rust string slice without any additional UTF-8 checks in place. It turned out that this function doesn\u0027t always return correct UTF-8 strings. For field of the SQLite side storage type `BLOB` this pointer can contain arbitrary bytes, which makes the usage of `str::from_utf8_unchecked` unsound as this violates the safety contract of `str` to only contain valid UTF-8 encoded Strings.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nThe preferred mitigation to the outlined problem is to update to a Diesel version 2.3.8 or newer, which includes fixes for the problem.\n\n## Resolution\n\nDiesel now correctly checks whether the provides byte buffer is actually valid UTF-8, instead of relying on SQLite\u0027s documentation. This fix is included in the `2.3.8` release.",
"id": "GHSA-h5x4-m2qf-r4f2",
"modified": "2026-05-05T18:08:05Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T18:08:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/diesel-rs/diesel/pull/5042"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/diesel-rs/diesel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0111.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Diesel\u0027s SQLite backend has possible UTF-8 corruption"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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