GHSA-H6FJ-2F26-G348
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: keembay - Fix AEAD unregister count in error path
register_aes_algs() registers the AEAD algorithms before registering the skcipher algorithms. If skcipher registration fails, the function unwinds the earlier AEAD registration with crypto_engine_unregister_aeads(), but it passes ARRAY_SIZE(algs), which is the skcipher table size.
Use ARRAY_SIZE(algs_aead) for the AEAD unwind path so the unregister helper iterates over the same table that was registered. Also clarify the nearby comment: the crypto registration helpers clean up algorithms registered within the same call, while this function must still unwind earlier successful registration steps.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93155"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:10Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: keembay - Fix AEAD unregister count in error path\n\nregister_aes_algs() registers the AEAD algorithms before registering the\nskcipher algorithms. If skcipher registration fails, the function unwinds\nthe earlier AEAD registration with crypto_engine_unregister_aeads(), but it\npasses ARRAY_SIZE(algs), which is the skcipher table size.\n\nUse ARRAY_SIZE(algs_aead) for the AEAD unwind path so the unregister helper\niterates over the same table that was registered. Also clarify the nearby\ncomment: the crypto registration helpers clean up algorithms registered\nwithin the same call, while this function must still unwind earlier\nsuccessful registration steps.",
"id": "GHSA-h6fj-2f26-g348",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27ec91c29ee155cc507b2f56221fc6fab65dbb51"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5607b101d86cbee8dd1ffab784495c880ca73383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5bbb726d27ff6dff750264e51aa665538394d0f8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3217fe7998622728a53dff405615e0971949eaf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e264401ce4776a288524e5b87593d4d864147115"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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