GHSA-H6W7-QMCM-Q6XR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 16:19 – Updated: 2026-10-07 16:19Summary
When property-file/Map-based ConnectionFactory setup fails while parsing the uri key, the library wraps the underlying exception with the raw connection string — including the plaintext username and password — baked verbatim into the new exception's message.
Details
ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(ConnectionFactory, Map<String,String>, String) (src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.java, lines 142-155):
String uri = properties.get(prefix + "uri");
if (uri != null) {
try {
cf.setUri(uri);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
} catch (KeyManagementException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
}
}
uri is the full AMQP URI — amqp(s)://username:password@host:port/vhost — concatenated verbatim into the exception message on any of the three catch branches. No masking/redaction exists anywhere in this class or in ConnectionFactory.setUri(). This is the library's documented Spring-Boot/ops-config entry point (ConnectionFactory.load(...), available since 4.4.0), not obscure internal code.
RabbitMQ's own AMQP URI spec (rabbitmq.com/docs/uri-spec) explicitly warns the password "should avoid leaking... the full URI should not appear in exception messages or log records." A sibling method twenty lines away (ConnectionFactory.setUri(URI)) already avoids this exact mistake for a different malformed-URI case — this path wasn't caught by that same care.
Note: KeyManagementException is declared in the throws clause but not actually reachable via the current setUri(String) → setUri(URI) call chain — the two real, reachable leak surfaces are the URISyntaxException branch (trivial, deterministic, scheme-independent) and the NoSuchAlgorithmException branch (real but narrower — amqps:// only, requires a restricted/FIPS-style default TLS provider).
PoC
Map<String, String> props = new HashMap<>();
props.put("uri", "amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod");
ConnectionFactory cf = new ConnectionFactory();
ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(cf, props, "");
Throws:
java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Error while setting AMQP URI: amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod
A password containing a space is entirely ordinary under common corporate password policies, and java.net.URI rejects such input outright — this isn't a contrived edge case.
Impact
Default Spring Boot startup-failure logging, an APM/error tracker, a CI job log, or an engineer pasting a stack trace into an internal or public ticket now holds the plaintext broker password, in a system typically far less access-controlled than wherever the credential is normally stored. Note the underlying URISyntaxException also carries the same string in its own message, chained as the cause of RabbitMQ's IllegalArgumentException — so removing RabbitMQ's own + uri concatenation alone would not fully close this; the raw secret-bearing string also shouldn't be handed to new URI() for error-reporting purposes at all.
Suggested fix: don't include the raw uri string in the wrapped exception's message — redact the userinfo component (or omit the URI entirely) before including it in any exception text.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.34.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.rabbitmq:amqp-client"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.35.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-106123"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-509"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T16:19:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T19:17:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWhen property-file/Map-based `ConnectionFactory` setup fails while parsing the `uri` key, the library wraps the underlying exception with the raw connection string \u2014 including the plaintext username and password \u2014 baked verbatim into the new exception\u0027s message.\n\n### Details\n`ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(ConnectionFactory, Map\u003cString,String\u003e, String)` (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.java`, lines 142-155):\n\n String uri = properties.get(prefix + \"uri\");\n if (uri != null) {\n try {\n cf.setUri(uri);\n } catch (URISyntaxException e) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"Error while setting AMQP URI: \" + uri, e);\n } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"Error while setting AMQP URI: \" + uri, e);\n } catch (KeyManagementException e) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"Error while setting AMQP URI: \" + uri, e);\n }\n }\n\n`uri` is the full AMQP URI \u2014 `amqp(s)://username:password@host:port/vhost` \u2014 concatenated verbatim into the exception message on any of the three catch branches. No masking/redaction exists anywhere in this class or in `ConnectionFactory.setUri()`. This is the library\u0027s documented Spring-Boot/ops-config entry point (`ConnectionFactory.load(...)`, available since 4.4.0), not obscure internal code.\n\nRabbitMQ\u0027s own AMQP URI spec (rabbitmq.com/docs/uri-spec) explicitly warns the password \"should avoid leaking... the full URI should not appear in exception messages or log records.\" A sibling method twenty lines away (`ConnectionFactory.setUri(URI)`) already avoids this exact mistake for a different malformed-URI case \u2014 this path wasn\u0027t caught by that same care.\n\nNote: `KeyManagementException` is declared in the throws clause but not actually reachable via the current `setUri(String)` \u2192 `setUri(URI)` call chain \u2014 the two real, reachable leak surfaces are the `URISyntaxException` branch (trivial, deterministic, scheme-independent) and the `NoSuchAlgorithmException` branch (real but narrower \u2014 `amqps://` only, requires a restricted/FIPS-style default TLS provider).\n\n### PoC\n Map\u003cString, String\u003e props = new HashMap\u003c\u003e();\n props.put(\"uri\", \"amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod\");\n ConnectionFactory cf = new ConnectionFactory();\n ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(cf, props, \"\");\n\nThrows:\n\n java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Error while setting AMQP URI: amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod\n\nA password containing a space is entirely ordinary under common corporate password policies, and `java.net.URI` rejects such input outright \u2014 this isn\u0027t a contrived edge case.\n\n### Impact\nDefault Spring Boot startup-failure logging, an APM/error tracker, a CI job log, or an engineer pasting a stack trace into an internal or public ticket now holds the plaintext broker password, in a system typically far less access-controlled than wherever the credential is normally stored. Note the underlying `URISyntaxException` also carries the same string in its own message, chained as the cause of RabbitMQ\u0027s `IllegalArgumentException` \u2014 so removing RabbitMQ\u0027s own `+ uri` concatenation alone would not fully close this; the raw secret-bearing string also shouldn\u0027t be handed to `new URI()` for error-reporting purposes at all.\n\nSuggested fix: don\u0027t include the raw `uri` string in the wrapped exception\u0027s message \u2014 redact the userinfo component (or omit the URI entirely) before including it in any exception text.",
"id": "GHSA-h6w7-qmcm-q6xr",
"modified": "2026-10-07T16:19:22Z",
"published": "2026-10-07T16:19:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-h6w7-qmcm-q6xr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2052"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/daca1875cdb8b8c0acce78f71103b21a05478446"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.35.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "RabbitMQ Java client: plaintext broker credentials leaked in exception message from ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load()"
}
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