GHSA-H6X4-53V9-P3RG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: validate non-resident attribute offsets
ntfs_attr_update_meta() shifts the attribute name when converting between non-sparse and sparse attributes. Converting to sparse also adds the compressed_size field before the name and mapping pairs, requiring eight additional bytes in the attribute record.
However, the validator does not check that name_offset is within safe boundaries for these operations or that the additional space is available. A malicious MFT record could set name_offset such that:
-
The name is positioned at the very end of a non-sparse attribute. Converting to sparse would shift the name forward by 8 bytes, writing beyond the attribute boundary.
-
The name overlaps with the mapping pairs, causing corruption during conversion.
Add validation to ensure: - For named attributes, name_offset is within valid bounds - Name does not extend beyond the attribute or overlap with mapping pairs - For non-sparse, non-compressed attributes, eight bytes are available after mapping_pairs_offset for the compressed_size field
The space check also covers unnamed attributes, for which name_offset = 0 is valid and no name range needs to be checked.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89611"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:46Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: validate non-resident attribute offsets\n\nntfs_attr_update_meta() shifts the attribute name when converting between\nnon-sparse and sparse attributes. Converting to sparse also adds the\ncompressed_size field before the name and mapping pairs, requiring eight\nadditional bytes in the attribute record.\n\nHowever, the validator does not check that name_offset is within safe\nboundaries for these operations or that the additional space is available.\nA malicious MFT record could set name_offset such that:\n\n1. The name is positioned at the very end of a non-sparse attribute.\n Converting to sparse would shift the name forward by 8 bytes,\n writing beyond the attribute boundary.\n\n2. The name overlaps with the mapping pairs, causing corruption during\n conversion.\n\nAdd validation to ensure:\n- For named attributes, name_offset is within valid bounds\n- Name does not extend beyond the attribute or overlap with mapping pairs\n- For non-sparse, non-compressed attributes, eight bytes are available\n after mapping_pairs_offset for the compressed_size field\n\nThe space check also covers unnamed attributes, for which name_offset = 0\nis valid and no name range needs to be checked.",
"id": "GHSA-h6x4-53v9-p3rg",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:20Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a83e82b0ec3ae523028e24813f23f18b43e8fc1c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd7b3dc7557faadeea626034e3bac68a449851ef"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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