GHSA-H8MM-C463-WJQ3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-28 22:44 – Updated: 2026-05-08 15:28
VLAI
Summary
CoreDNS' transfer stanza selection uses lexicographic compare (subzone ACL bypass)
Details

Summary

CoreDNS' transfer plugin can select the wrong ACL stanza when both a parent zone and a more-specific subzone are configured. A permissive parent-zone transfer rule can override a restrictive subzone rule (name-dependent), allowing an unauthorized client to perform AXFR/IXFR for the subzone and retrieve its zone contents.

Details

In plugin/transfer/transfer.go, stanza selection is implemented by longestMatch(), which is documented as "longest zone match wins", but it actually chooses the winner via a lexicographic string comparison: - zone := "" // longest zone match wins (plugin/transfer/transfer.go) - if z > zone { zone = z; x = xfr } (plugin/transfer/transfer.go)

So, a parent zone like example.org. can beat a child zone like a.example.org. purely due to lexicographic ordering ("example.org." > "a.example.org."), even though the child zone is the longer/more specific suffix match. The bypass is data-dependent (some child labels will win, some will lose), making it operationally non-intuitive.

PoC

  1. Adjust COREDNS_BIN in the PoC to point at right path (see the top-level const definitions for tunables as well)
  2. Run python3 ./acl-repro.py
  3. Expected output: *** Baseline (only subzone transfer rule) *** axfr a.example.org.: rcode=5 ancount=0 (expected REFUSED=5)

*** Candidate (add permissive parent transfer rule) *** axfr a.example.org.: rcode=0 ancount=5 (expected NOERROR=0 with ancount>0)

*** OK *** Subzone transfer ACL bypass reproduced: adding a permissive parent-zone stanza can override a stricter child-zone stanza due to lexicographic zone selection.

Impact

Unauthorized zone transfer can expose full zone contents to a remote network client that was intended to be denied by a subzone-specific transfer policy.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coredns/coredns"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33489"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-28T22:44:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T20:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nCoreDNS\u0027 transfer plugin can select the wrong ACL stanza when both a parent zone and a more-specific subzone are configured. A permissive parent-zone transfer rule can override a restrictive subzone rule (name-dependent), allowing an unauthorized client to perform AXFR/IXFR for the subzone and retrieve its zone contents.\n\n### Details\nIn plugin/transfer/transfer.go, stanza selection is implemented by longestMatch(), which is documented as \"longest zone match wins\", but it actually chooses the winner via a lexicographic string comparison:\n- zone := \"\" // longest zone match wins (plugin/transfer/transfer.go)\n- if z \u003e zone { zone = z; x = xfr } (plugin/transfer/transfer.go)\n\nSo, a parent zone like example.org. can beat a child zone like a.example.org. purely due to lexicographic ordering (\"example.org.\" \u003e \"a.example.org.\"), even though the child zone is the longer/more specific suffix match. The bypass is data-dependent (some child labels will win, some will lose), making it operationally non-intuitive.\n\n### PoC\n1. Adjust COREDNS_BIN in the PoC to point at right path (see the top-level const definitions for tunables as well)\n2. Run python3 ./acl-repro.py\n3. Expected output:\n*** Baseline (only subzone transfer rule) ***\naxfr a.example.org.: rcode=5 ancount=0 (expected REFUSED=5)\n\n*** Candidate (add permissive parent transfer rule) ***\naxfr a.example.org.: rcode=0 ancount=5 (expected NOERROR=0 with ancount\u003e0)\n\n*** OK ***\nSubzone transfer ACL bypass reproduced: adding a permissive parent-zone stanza can override a stricter child-zone stanza due to lexicographic zone selection.\n\n### Impact\nUnauthorized zone transfer can expose full zone contents to a remote network client that was intended to be denied by a subzone-specific transfer policy.",
  "id": "GHSA-h8mm-c463-wjq3",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T15:28:38Z",
  "published": "2026-04-28T22:44:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coredns/coredns/security/advisories/GHSA-h8mm-c463-wjq3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33489"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coredns/coredns"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coredns/coredns/releases/tag/v1.14.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CoreDNS\u0027 transfer stanza selection uses lexicographic compare (subzone ACL bypass)"
}



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