GHSA-H9CC-W26M-J342

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 19:45 – Updated: 2026-05-21 19:45
VLAI
Summary
nimiq-keys: Denial of service in Ed25519 multisig delinearization via invalid curve points
Details

Impact

A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the Ed25519 multisig delinearization code path. Ed25519PublicKey::delinearize() in keys/src/multisig/mod.rs called .unwrap() on curve point decompression, which panics when a public key is constructed from 32 bytes that do not represent a valid point on the Ed25519 curve. Ed25519PublicKey construction only validates byte length, not curve membership, so invalid keys can reach the delinearization path and crash the hosting process.

A secondary panic existed in Commitment::From<[u8; 32]>, which similarly called .unwrap() on a failing curve point decompression.

Who is affected: Browser and desktop wallet users of the web-client WASM library and the nimiq-wallet crate, when initiating a multisig operation with an attacker-supplied public key. An attacker must convince the user to include a crafted public key in a multisig setup — this is not a remotely triggerable node/validator crash.

Who is NOT affected: Validator nodes, consensus, blockchain, mempool, and networking code. There is no on-chain multisig account type; multisig is a purely client-side construct, and no validator/consensus code calls the multisig delinearization path.

Patches

See PR.

Workarounds

No code-level workaround exists short of the patch. Users of wallet applications can mitigate exposure by only performing multisig operations with public keys received from trusted sources.

Resources

  • Affected code: keys/src/multisig/mod.rs, keys/src/multisig/commitment.rs
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "nimiq-keys"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46542"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-617"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T19:45:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the Ed25519 multisig delinearization code path. `Ed25519PublicKey::delinearize()` in `keys/src/multisig/mod.rs` called `.unwrap()` on curve point decompression, which panics when a public key is\nconstructed from 32 bytes that do not represent a valid point on the Ed25519 curve. `Ed25519PublicKey` construction only validates byte length, not curve membership, so invalid keys can reach the delinearization path and crash the\nhosting process.\n\nA secondary panic existed in `Commitment::From\u003c[u8; 32]\u003e`, which similarly called `.unwrap()` on a failing curve point decompression.\n\n**Who is affected:** Browser and desktop wallet users of the web-client WASM library and the `nimiq-wallet` crate, when initiating a multisig operation with an attacker-supplied public key. An attacker must convince the user to include\na crafted public key in a multisig setup \u2014 this is not a remotely triggerable node/validator crash.\n\n**Who is NOT affected:** Validator nodes, consensus, blockchain, mempool, and networking code. There is no on-chain multisig account type; multisig is a purely client-side construct, and no validator/consensus code calls the multisig  delinearization path.\n\n### Patches\n\nSee [PR](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3713).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo code-level workaround exists short of the patch. Users of wallet applications can mitigate exposure by only performing multisig operations with public keys received from trusted sources.\n\n### Resources\n- Affected code: `keys/src/multisig/mod.rs`, `keys/src/multisig/commitment.rs`",
  "id": "GHSA-h9cc-w26m-j342",
  "modified": "2026-05-21T19:45:08Z",
  "published": "2026-05-21T19:45:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-h9cc-w26m-j342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3713"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/3bc449a8138960c4de6bfd506bad1730c621d4de"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nimiq-keys: Denial of service in Ed25519 multisig delinearization via invalid curve points"
}


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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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