{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fuxa-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.1.14-1243"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47720"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T23:06:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe TDengine DAQ storage connector\u0027s `escapeTdString` at `server/runtime/storage/tdengine/index.js:10` doubles single quotes but does not escape backslashes. TDengine\u0027s SQL parser treats `\\\u0027` as a literal single quote inside a string, so a tag id of the form `x\\\u0027 OR 1=1--` escapes the first single quote, lets the doubled quote close the string, and appends an injected clause that runs on the TDengine server. An attacker (Alice) sends the crafted `sids` value through `GET /api/daq` or the Socket.IO `DAQ_QUERY` event and reads every row in `fuxa.meters`, which holds the historical tag values of every PLC the FUXA instance records.\n\n## Details\n\nThe TDengine DAQ storage connector did not correctly sanitize user-controlled values before including them in SQL queries.\n\nA specially crafted tag identifier could bypass the intended escaping logic and alter the query executed against the TDengine database.\n\nThis could allow unauthorized access to historical DAQ data stored in TDengine, including recorded tag values and related metadata.\n\nThe issue has been fixed in version 1.3.2 by improving input escaping in the TDengine connector.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with network access to a FUXA instance configured with TDengine as the DAQ backend reads the entire historical tag-value archive: every PLC tag the instance has recorded, plus the associated device ids and device names. Turning on authentication does not close the gap: the Socket.IO `DAQ_QUERY` handler has no authorization check, and `/api/daq` accepts guest-level requests. No login is needed in the default configuration.\n\n**CVSS 3.1**: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` (Medium, 5.3). CWE-89.\n---\nA fix is available at https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.3.2.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-h9fj-c2qr-76g2",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:06:43Z",
  "published": "2026-06-08T23:06:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/security/advisories/GHSA-h9fj-c2qr-76g2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FUXA has SQL Injection in its TDengine DAQ connector via backslash bypass of escapeTdString"
}