{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "ml-dsa"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.0-rc.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22705"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1240"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T15:10:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-10T07:16:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature.\n\n### Details\n\nThe analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags:\n\n- **UDIV/SDIV instructions**: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values.\n\nThe `decompose` function used a hardware division instruction to compute `r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32`. This function is called during signing through `high_bits()` and `low_bits()`, which process values derived from secret key components:\n\n- `(\u0026w - \u0026cs2).low_bits()` where `cs2` is derived from secret key component `s2`\n- `Hint::new()` calls `high_bits()` on values derived from secret key component `t0`\n\n**Original Code**:\n```rust\nfn decompose\u003cTwoGamma2: Unsigned\u003e(self) -\u003e (Elem, Elem) {\n    // ...\n    let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;\n    r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32;  // Variable-time division on secret-derived data\n    (r1, r0)\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nI do not have an exploit written for this, currently.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe dividend (`r1.0`) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nReplacing division with constant-time Barrett reduction mitigates this risk. Since `TwoGamma2` is a compile-time constant, we precompute the multiplicative inverse:\n\n```patch\ndiff --git a/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs b/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs\nindex 559b68a..bb126ce 100644\n--- a/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs\n+++ b/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs\n@@ -54,8 +54,50 @@ pub(crate) trait Decompose {\n     fn decompose\u003cTwoGamma2: Unsigned\u003e(self) -\u003e (Elem, Elem);\n }\n \n+/// Constant-time division by a compile-time constant divisor.\n+///\n+/// This trait provides a constant-time alternative to the hardware division\n+/// instruction, which has variable timing based on operand values.\n+/// Uses Barrett reduction to compute `x / M` where M is a compile-time constant.\n+pub(crate) trait ConstantTimeDiv: Unsigned {\n+    /// Bit shift for Barrett reduction, chosen to provide sufficient precision\n+    const CT_DIV_SHIFT: usize;\n+    /// Precomputed multiplier: ceil(2^SHIFT / M)\n+    const CT_DIV_MULTIPLIER: u64;\n+\n+    /// Perform constant-time division of x by Self::U32\n+    /// Requires: x \u003c Q (the field modulus, ~2^23)\n+    #[inline(always)]\n+    fn ct_div(x: u32) -\u003e u32 {\n+        // Barrett reduction: q = (x * MULTIPLIER) \u003e\u003e SHIFT\n+        // This gives us floor(x / M) for x \u003c 2^SHIFT / MULTIPLIER * M\n+        let x64 = u64::from(x);\n+        let quotient = (x64 * Self::CT_DIV_MULTIPLIER) \u003e\u003e Self::CT_DIV_SHIFT;\n+        quotient as u32\n+    }\n+}\n+\n+impl\u003cM\u003e ConstantTimeDiv for M\n+where\n+    M: Unsigned,\n+{\n+    // Use a shift that provides enough precision for the ML-DSA field (Q ~ 2^23)\n+    // We need SHIFT \u003e log2(Q) + log2(M) to ensure accuracy\n+    // With Q \u003c 2^24 and M \u003c 2^20, SHIFT = 48 is sufficient\n+    const CT_DIV_SHIFT: usize = 48;\n+\n+    // Precompute the multiplier at compile time\n+    // We add (M-1) before dividing to get ceiling division, ensuring we never underestimate\n+    #[allow(clippy::integer_division_remainder_used)]\n+    const CT_DIV_MULTIPLIER: u64 = ((1u64 \u003c\u003c Self::CT_DIV_SHIFT) + M::U64 - 1) / M::U64;\n+}\n+\n impl Decompose for Elem {\n     // Algorithm 36 Decompose\n+    //\n+    // This implementation uses constant-time division to avoid timing side-channels.\n+    // The original algorithm used hardware division which has variable timing based\n+    // on operand values, potentially leaking secret information during signing.\n     fn decompose\u003cTwoGamma2: Unsigned\u003e(self) -\u003e (Elem, Elem) {\n         let r_plus = self.clone();\n         let r0 = r_plus.mod_plus_minus::\u003cTwoGamma2\u003e();\n@@ -63,8 +105,9 @@ impl Decompose for Elem {\n         if r_plus - r0 == Elem::new(BaseField::Q - 1) {\n             (Elem::new(0), r0 - Elem::new(1))\n         } else {\n-            let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;\n-            r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32;\n+            let diff = r_plus - r0;\n+            // Use constant-time division instead of hardware division\n+            let r1 = Elem::new(TwoGamma2::ct_div(diff.0));\n             (r1, r0)\n         }\n     }\n```\n\nSee our blog post on [how we avoided side-channels in our Go implementation of ML-DSA](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2025/11/14/how-we-avoided-side-channels-in-our-new-post-quantum-go-cryptography-libraries/) for more information.",
  "id": "GHSA-hcp2-x6j4-29j7",
  "modified": "2026-01-13T15:10:03Z",
  "published": "2026-01-13T15:10:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/security/advisories/GHSA-hcp2-x6j4-29j7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22705"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/pull/1144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/commit/035d9eef98486ecd00a8bf418c7817eb14dd6558"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RustCrypto: Signatures has timing side-channel in ML-DSA decomposition"
}