GHSA-HFPR-JHPQ-X4RM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-09 19:54 – Updated: 2026-03-09 19:54
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: `operator.write` chat.send could reach admin-only config writes
Details

Summary

A gateway client authenticated with operator.write could route /config set or /config unset through chat.send and reach persistent config mutation even though direct config RPC methods are admin-scoped.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published vulnerable version: 2026.3.2
  • Affected range: <= 2026.3.2
  • Patched in: 2026.3.7

Details

Before the fix, chat.send ran slash commands in an internal gateway-chat context with CommandAuthorized: true, and /config write paths only checked command authorization plus commands.config / channels.<provider>.configWrites gates. That allowed an authenticated operator.write gateway client to bridge into persistent config writes even though direct config.* RPC methods remain operator.admin scoped.

The fix keeps command functionality intact while restoring the intended scope boundary: - persistent /config set|unset writes routed through gateway chat.send now require operator.admin - read-only /config show remains available to normal write-scoped gateway clients - normal messaging-channel /config behavior remains unchanged

Impact

This is a real authorization mismatch, but exploitability requires an already authenticated gateway client with operator.write, chat.send access, and /config command support enabled. Maintainer severity is set to medium because the bug is a scoped control-plane privilege mismatch rather than a broad unauthenticated or generic remote compromise. The main consequence is unintended persistent config mutation.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 5f8f58ae25e2a78f31b06edcf26532d634ca554e

Release Process Note

npm 2026.3.7 was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.

Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T19:54:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA gateway client authenticated with `operator.write` could route `/config set` or `/config unset` through `chat.send` and reach persistent config mutation even though direct config RPC methods are admin-scoped.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.3.2`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched in: `2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nBefore the fix, `chat.send` ran slash commands in an internal gateway-chat context with `CommandAuthorized: true`, and `/config` write paths only checked command authorization plus `commands.config` / `channels.\u003cprovider\u003e.configWrites` gates. That allowed an authenticated `operator.write` gateway client to bridge into persistent config writes even though direct `config.*` RPC methods remain `operator.admin` scoped.\n\nThe fix keeps command functionality intact while restoring the intended scope boundary:\n- persistent `/config set|unset` writes routed through gateway `chat.send` now require `operator.admin`\n- read-only `/config show` remains available to normal write-scoped gateway clients\n- normal messaging-channel `/config` behavior remains unchanged\n\n### Impact\nThis is a real authorization mismatch, but exploitability requires an already authenticated gateway client with `operator.write`, `chat.send` access, and `/config` command support enabled. Maintainer severity is set to medium because the bug is a scoped control-plane privilege mismatch rather than a broad unauthenticated or generic remote compromise. The main consequence is unintended persistent config mutation.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `5f8f58ae25e2a78f31b06edcf26532d634ca554e`\n\n### Release Process Note\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-hfpr-jhpq-x4rm",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T19:54:41Z",
  "published": "2026-03-09T19:54:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-hfpr-jhpq-x4rm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5f8f58ae25e2a78f31b06edcf26532d634ca554e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: `operator.write` chat.send could reach admin-only config writes"
}



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