GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-HR98-GM7C-926R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-03-18 21:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

md: suspend array while updating raid_disks via sysfs

In raid1_reshape(), freeze_array() is called before modifying the r1bio memory pool (conf->r1bio_pool) and conf->raid_disks, and unfreeze_array() is called after the update is completed.

However, freeze_array() only waits until nr_sync_pending and (nr_pending - nr_queued) of all buckets reaches zero. When an I/O error occurs, nr_queued is increased and the corresponding r1bio is queued to either retry_list or bio_end_io_list. As a result, freeze_array() may unblock before these r1bios are released.

This can lead to a situation where conf->raid_disks and the mempool have already been updated while queued r1bios, allocated with the old raid_disks value, are later released. Consequently, free_r1bio() may access memory out of bounds in put_all_bios() and release r1bios of the wrong size to the new mempool, potentially causing issues with the mempool as well.

Since only normal I/O might increase nr_queued while an I/O error occurs, suspending the array avoids this issue.

Note: Updating raid_disks via ioctl SET_ARRAY_INFO already suspends the array. Therefore, we suspend the array when updating raid_disks via sysfs to avoid this issue too.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-71225"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-18T15:18:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmd: suspend array while updating raid_disks via sysfs\n\nIn raid1_reshape(), freeze_array() is called before modifying the r1bio\nmemory pool (conf-\u003er1bio_pool) and conf-\u003eraid_disks, and\nunfreeze_array() is called after the update is completed.\n\nHowever, freeze_array() only waits until nr_sync_pending and\n(nr_pending - nr_queued) of all buckets reaches zero. When an I/O error\noccurs, nr_queued is increased and the corresponding r1bio is queued to\neither retry_list or bio_end_io_list. As a result, freeze_array() may\nunblock before these r1bios are released.\n\nThis can lead to a situation where conf-\u003eraid_disks and the mempool have\nalready been updated while queued r1bios, allocated with the old\nraid_disks value, are later released. Consequently, free_r1bio() may\naccess memory out of bounds in put_all_bios() and release r1bios of the\nwrong size to the new mempool, potentially causing issues with the\nmempool as well.\n\nSince only normal I/O might increase nr_queued while an I/O error occurs,\nsuspending the array avoids this issue.\n\nNote: Updating raid_disks via ioctl SET_ARRAY_INFO already suspends\nthe array. Therefore, we suspend the array when updating raid_disks\nvia sysfs to avoid this issue too.",
  "id": "GHSA-hr98-gm7c-926r",
  "modified": "2026-03-18T21:32:57Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T15:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0107b18cd8ac17eb3e54786adc05a85cdbb6ef22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/165d1359f945b72c5f90088f60d48ff46115269e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2cc583653bbe050bacd1cadcc9776d39bf449740"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…