GHSA-HV3G-87GW-4M9V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-11 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: fix delegation_hash_table leak when nfs4_server_common_setup() fails
nfs4_server_common_setup() allocates server->delegation_hash_table first, but server->destroy - the only path that frees the table via nfs4_destroy_server() - is not assigned until the very end of the function. If any intermediate step fails (the is_ds_only_client() check, nfs4_init_session(), nfs4_get_rootfh(), or nfs_probe_server()), the function returns with server->destroy still NULL, so the caller's nfs_free_server() skips the destroy callback and the hash table is leaked (4 KiB per attempt with the default delegation watermark).
This is trivially reachable from userspace: every failed NFSv4 mount leaks one allocation. A client that persistently retries a mount that cannot succeed leaks kernel memory without bound. Observed in production where a Longhorn backup poller retried mount.nfs4 against an NFSv3-only server roughly 10 times per second, leaking ~3.4 GiB of unreclaimable slab (kmalloc-rnd-13-4k) per day; the node accumulated 12 GiB of leaked slab before the source was identified via the kmem:kmalloc tracepoint (call_site=nfs4_delegation_hash_alloc).
Reproducer:
# server exports NFSv3 only (or export path absent for v4) while :; do mount -t nfs4 :/missing /mnt; done # watch SUnreclaim in /proc/meminfo grow 4 KiB per iteration
Free the table on the error paths between the allocation and the assignment of server->destroy.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89714"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:58Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: fix delegation_hash_table leak when nfs4_server_common_setup() fails\n\nnfs4_server_common_setup() allocates server-\u003edelegation_hash_table\nfirst, but server-\u003edestroy - the only path that frees the table via\nnfs4_destroy_server() - is not assigned until the very end of the\nfunction. If any intermediate step fails (the is_ds_only_client()\ncheck, nfs4_init_session(), nfs4_get_rootfh(), or nfs_probe_server()),\nthe function returns with server-\u003edestroy still NULL, so the caller\u0027s\nnfs_free_server() skips the destroy callback and the hash table is\nleaked (4 KiB per attempt with the default delegation watermark).\n\nThis is trivially reachable from userspace: every failed NFSv4 mount\nleaks one allocation. A client that persistently retries a mount that\ncannot succeed leaks kernel memory without bound. Observed in\nproduction where a Longhorn backup poller retried mount.nfs4 against\nan NFSv3-only server roughly 10 times per second, leaking ~3.4 GiB of\nunreclaimable slab (kmalloc-rnd-13-4k) per day; the node accumulated\n12 GiB of leaked slab before the source was identified via the\nkmem:kmalloc tracepoint (call_site=nfs4_delegation_hash_alloc).\n\nReproducer:\n\n # server exports NFSv3 only (or export path absent for v4)\n while :; do mount -t nfs4 \u003cserver\u003e:/missing /mnt; done\n # watch SUnreclaim in /proc/meminfo grow 4 KiB per iteration\n\nFree the table on the error paths between the allocation and the\nassignment of server-\u003edestroy.",
"id": "GHSA-hv3g-87gw-4m9v",
"modified": "2026-09-11T21:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89714"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fd2b9687dae36be5b84eab39b4c627bb7ab33b3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2092f5b38f88be306140c77aeeeb43fc1adacacc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3adf1643517357221422c05986d6de5df7b9913"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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