{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "surrealdb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T22:10:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A record user could read field values hidden from them by field-level SELECT permissions by reaching the records through a graph-edge (`-\u003e`) or back-reference (`\u003c~`) traversal instead of a direct `SELECT`.\n\nWhen a table was readable at the table level but carried a field hidden by a field-level permission (`DEFINE FIELD secret ON knows PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE`), a direct `SELECT * FROM knows` hid `secret` \u2014 but reaching the same records through a traversal that yields full objects \u2014 `person:bob-\u003e(SELECT * FROM knows)`, `person:bob\u003c~(SELECT * FROM comment)`, or a projected target vertex `-\u003eknows-\u003e(SELECT * FROM person)` \u2014 returned it intact.\n\nThe root cause: the shared `resolve_record_batch` helper used by `GraphEdgeScan` (`FullEdge`) and `ReferenceScan` (`FullRecord`) enforced only the table-level SELECT permission and pushed raw record data, never running the field-level filtering (`build_field_state` / `filter_fields_by_permission`) that ordinary table scans and `fetch_record` apply.\n\n### Impact\n\nA record user can read the values of fields hidden by field-level SELECT permissions, on tables they already hold table-level SELECT on, by materialising the records through a graph-edge, back-reference, or target-vertex traversal \u2014 recovering the values directly, for every record the traversal returns.\n\nThe disclosure is confined to the field-permission layer: it grants **no unauthorised cross-table, cross-record, or cross-namespace/database access**. The table\u0027s own SELECT permission \u2014 including any row-level `WHERE` predicate \u2014 is still enforced, so the caller only reaches records they were already entitled to read; only the per-field SELECT filtering within those records is skipped. Root and record-owner sessions are unaffected, and data cannot be modified (confidentiality only).\n\nTable-level enforcement on these traversals landed in 3.1.0 (the fix for GHSA-vjjx-rfw4-rmfc); releases before 3.1.0 additionally exposed whole records on tables the caller could not read, and are covered by that advisory.\n\n### Patches\n\n`resolve_record_batch` (the shared helper that materialises full records for graph and reference traversals) now applies field-level SELECT permissions and read-time `COMPUTED` fields to each record, matching the regular table-scan and `fetch_record` paths.\n\nVersions 3.1.5 and later are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Force the unaffected legacy executor with `--planner-strategy compute-only` (env `SURREAL_PLANNER_STRATEGY`).\n- Do not rely on field-level SELECT permissions to hide values on tables reachable as a graph edge, reference target, or traversal vertex; restrict at the table level instead.\n- Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.\n\n### References\n\n- [SurrealQL Documentation \u2014 DEFINE FIELD](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/field)\n- [SurrealQL Documentation \u2014 DEFINE TABLE \u2026 PERMISSIONS](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/table)\n- [SurrealQL Documentation \u2014 Graph relationships](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/datamodel/relationships)\n- `fix(exec): apply field-level SELECT permissions + computed fields when graph/reference traversals materialize full records`",
  "id": "GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T22:10:53Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T22:10:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via graph and reference traversals"
}