GHSA-J22F-VQ7H-C4QM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-01 15:18 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:18Impact
stringify and uneval serialize a typed array by emitting its backing ArrayBuffer, not just the view. In the case of a Node Buffer object, the backing buffer is a process-wide shared pool, meaning unrelated memory can be serialized into a response that is then sent to the client. For a Node Buffer the backing store is Node's process-wide shared pool, so serializing a small Buffer copies up to 64 KB of unrelated process memory — including bytes from other in-flight requests — into the output. In an SSR framework (SvelteKit, Nuxt) a public page whose load() returns a 2-byte Buffer, or a small file read with readFileSync, ships another user's request body / Authorization header in its HTML. Unauthenticated, silent, ~43,000× amplification.
This is serialization-side, so the parse/unflatten prototype-pollution and DoS guards do not apply — it fires on every SSR render, not only when parsing untrusted input.
Workarounds
Convert Node Buffer objects to Uint8Array:
payload = {
- buffer
+ buffer: new Uint8Array(buffer)
}
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.9.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "devalue"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.9.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92708"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-226"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-01T15:18:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-18T20:17:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`stringify` and `uneval` serialize a typed array by emitting its backing `ArrayBuffer`, not just the view. In the case of a Node `Buffer` object, the backing buffer is a process-wide shared pool, meaning unrelated memory can be serialized into a response that is then sent to the client. For a Node `Buffer` the backing store is Node\u0027s **process-wide shared pool**, so serializing a small `Buffer` copies up to 64 KB of unrelated process memory \u2014 including bytes from other in-flight requests \u2014 into the output. In an SSR framework (SvelteKit, Nuxt) a public page whose `load()` returns a 2-byte `Buffer`, or a small file read with `readFileSync`, ships another user\u0027s request body / `Authorization` header in its HTML. Unauthenticated, silent, ~43,000\u00d7 amplification.\n\nThis is serialization-side, so the `parse`/`unflatten` prototype-pollution and DoS guards do not apply \u2014 it fires on every SSR render, not only when parsing untrusted input.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nConvert Node `Buffer` objects to `Uint8Array`:\n\n```diff\npayload = {\n- buffer\n+ buffer: new Uint8Array(buffer)\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-j22f-vq7h-c4qm",
"modified": "2026-10-01T15:18:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T15:18:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/security/advisories/GHSA-j22f-vq7h-c4qm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92708"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/commit/46dc877b3570dafb1cd3291b9bb48cecef8f7266"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/releases/tag/v5.9.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "devalue: `stringify`/`uneval` serialize shared memory"
}
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