GHSA-J3RV-43J4-C7QM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 21:21 – Updated: 2026-06-23 21:21
VLAI
Summary
jackson-databind has a PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass via generic type parameters that allows arbitrary class instantiation
Details

jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV.

If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization.

An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list.

This is the same vulnerability class responsible for the historical sequence of jackson-databind deserialization CVEs; here it manifests as a validator bypass rather than a missing deny-list entry.

Impact

  • Bypass of the PTV allow-list, including the recommended BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator configured with name-prefix allow rules.
  • Arbitrary class instantiation of any type assignable to the container's element/parameter position, with attacker-controlled property values (setter/field injection).
  • Potential unauthenticated remote code execution when a class with exploitable side effects (JNDI lookup, JDBC/connection-pool gadgets,TemplatesImpl-style loaders, etc.) is present on the classpath.

Applications that accept untrusted JSON and rely on a configured PTV — the documented, security-conscious configuration — are affected.

Proof of Concept

Configuration restricting polymorphic deserialization to a single safe container:

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
        .allowIfSubType("java.util.ArrayList")
        .build();

ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
        .polymorphicTypeValidator(ptv)
        .build();

Malicious payload (Wrapper.value is Object with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS, include = As.WRAPPER_ARRAY)):

{"value":["java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.EvilGadget>",[{"cmd":"calc.exe"}]]}

On vulnerable versions, com.evil.EvilGadget is instantiated and its cmd property is set, despite only java.util.ArrayList being allow-listed. On 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4 the deserialization throws InvalidTypeIdException before instantiation.

Variant payloads (all bypass an ArrayList/HashMap allow-list):

Type ID Smuggled type position
java.util.ArrayList<Evil> list element
java.util.HashMap<Evil,String> map key
java.util.HashMap<String,Evil> map value
java.util.ArrayList<java.util.ArrayList<Evil>> nested element
java.util.ArrayList<Evil[]> array element

Patches

Fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4 and 3.1.4 via the changes for FasterXML/jackson-databind#5988, commit 434d6c511. The fix adds recursive validation of each non-trivial type parameter (and array element types appearing as parameters) through the full PTV chain, with documented exemptions for Object (wildcard resolution) and Enum types.

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.18.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.18.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.21.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.19.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.21.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54512"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T21:21:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "`jackson-databind`\u0027s `PolymorphicTypeValidator` (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains `\u003c`), `DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric()` validates **only the raw container class name** (the substring before `\u003c`) against the configured PTV.\n\nIf the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via `TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical()` and returns the fully parameterized type **without ever validating the nested type arguments** against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization.\n\nAn attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container \u2014 for example `java.util.ArrayList\u003ccom.evil.Gadget\u003e` when only `java.util.ArrayList` is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; `com.evil.Gadget` is loaded via `Class.forName(name, true, loader)`, instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list.\n\nThis is the same vulnerability class responsible for the historical sequence of jackson-databind deserialization CVEs; here it manifests as a validator bypass rather than a missing deny-list entry.\n\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Bypass of the PTV allow-list**, including the recommended `BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator` configured with name-prefix allow rules.\n- **Arbitrary class instantiation** of any type assignable to the container\u0027s element/parameter position, with attacker-controlled property values (setter/field injection).\n- **Potential unauthenticated remote code execution** when a class with exploitable side effects (JNDI lookup, JDBC/connection-pool gadgets,`TemplatesImpl`-style loaders, etc.) is present on the classpath.\n\nApplications that accept untrusted JSON and rely on a configured PTV \u2014 the documented, security-conscious configuration \u2014 are affected.\n\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nConfiguration restricting polymorphic deserialization to a single safe container:\n\n```java\nBasicPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()\n        .allowIfSubType(\"java.util.ArrayList\")\n        .build();\n\nObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()\n        .polymorphicTypeValidator(ptv)\n        .build();\n```\n\nMalicious payload (`Wrapper.value` is `Object` with `@JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS, include = As.WRAPPER_ARRAY)`):\n\n```json\n{\"value\":[\"java.util.ArrayList\u003ccom.evil.EvilGadget\u003e\",[{\"cmd\":\"calc.exe\"}]]}\n```\n\nOn vulnerable versions, `com.evil.EvilGadget` is instantiated and its `cmd` property is set, despite only `java.util.ArrayList` being allow-listed. On `2.18.8` / `2.21.4` / `3.1.4` the deserialization throws `InvalidTypeIdException` before instantiation.\n\n**Variant payloads** (all bypass an `ArrayList`/`HashMap` allow-list):\n\n| Type ID | Smuggled type position |\n|---|---|\n| `java.util.ArrayList\u003cEvil\u003e` | list element |\n| `java.util.HashMap\u003cEvil,String\u003e` | map key |\n| `java.util.HashMap\u003cString,Evil\u003e` | map value |\n| `java.util.ArrayList\u003cjava.util.ArrayList\u003cEvil\u003e\u003e` | nested element |\n| `java.util.ArrayList\u003cEvil[]\u003e` | array element |\n\n---\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **2.18.8**, **2.21.4** and **3.1.4** via the changes for [FasterXML/jackson-databind#5988](https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/5988), commit `434d6c511`. The fix adds recursive validation of each non-trivial type parameter (and array element types appearing as parameters) through the full PTV chain, with documented exemptions for `Object` (wildcard resolution) and `Enum` types.\n\n`PolymorphicTypeValidator` was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.",
  "id": "GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm",
  "modified": "2026-06-23T21:21:38Z",
  "published": "2026-06-23T21:21:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/5988"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/434d6c511de7fdd9872f29157aafb6162d12d8d5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "jackson-databind has a PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass via generic type parameters that allows arbitrary class instantiation"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…