GHSA-J4VR-PCMW-HX59

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-24 15:06 – Updated: 2025-10-29 15:42
VLAI?
Summary
Rancher user retains access to clusters despite Global Role removal
Details

Impact

A vulnerability has been identified within Rancher Manager, where after removing a custom GlobalRole that gives administrative access or the corresponding binding, the user still retains access to clusters. This only affects custom Global Roles that: - Have a * on * in * rule for resources - Have a * on * rule for non-resource URLs

For example

apiVersion: management.cattle.io/v3
kind: GlobalRole
metadata:
  name: custom-admin
rules:
  - apiGroups:
      - '*'
    resources:
      - '*'
    verbs:
      - '*'
  - nonResourceURLs:
      - '*'
    verbs:
      - '*'

Specifically: - When a user is bound to a custom admin GlobalRole, a corresponding ClusterRoleBinding is created on all clusters that binds them to the cluster-admin ClusterRole. - When such a GlobalRole or the GlobalRoleBinding (e.g., when the user is unassigned from this role in UI) is deleted, the ClusterRoleBinding that binds them to the cluster-admin ClusterRole stays behind.

This issue allows a user to continue having access to clusters after they have been unassigned from the custom admin global role or the role has been deleted.

Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Account Access Removal for further information about this category of attack.

Patches

This vulnerability is addressed by removing the corresponding ClusterRoleBindings whenever the admin GlobalRole or its GlobalRoleBindings are deleted. Previously orphaned ClusterRoleBindings are marked with the annotation authz.cluster.cattle.io/admin-globalrole-missing=true and should be deleted manually.

Orphaned ClusterRoleBindings can be listed with:

kubectl get clusterrolebinding -o jsonpath='{range .items[?(@.metadata.annotations.authz\.cluster\.cattle\.io/admin-globalrole-missing=="true")]}{.metadata.name}{"\n"}{end}'

Patched versions of Rancher include releases v2.12.3, v2.11.7.

Complications with the restricted admin functionality prevented the patches from being included in v2.10 and v2.9.

Workarounds

If the deployment can't be upgraded to a fixed version, users are advised to manually identify the orphaned ClusterRoleBindings and remove them.

References

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Contact the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/rancher/rancher"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20251014212116-7faa74a968c2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-32199"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-281"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-24T15:06:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-29T15:15:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nA vulnerability has been identified within Rancher Manager, where after removing a custom GlobalRole that gives administrative access or the corresponding binding, the user still retains access to clusters.\nThis only affects custom Global Roles that:\n- Have a `*` on `*` in `*` rule for resources\n- Have a `*` on `*` rule for non-resource URLs\n\nFor example\n```yaml\napiVersion: management.cattle.io/v3\nkind: GlobalRole\nmetadata:\n  name: custom-admin\nrules:\n  - apiGroups:\n      - \u0027*\u0027\n    resources:\n      - \u0027*\u0027\n    verbs:\n      - \u0027*\u0027\n  - nonResourceURLs:\n      - \u0027*\u0027\n    verbs:\n      - \u0027*\u0027\n```\n\nSpecifically:\n- When a user is bound to a custom admin `GlobalRole`, a corresponding `ClusterRoleBinding` is created on all clusters that binds them to the cluster-admin `ClusterRole`.\n- When such a `GlobalRole` or the `GlobalRoleBinding` (e.g., when the user is unassigned from this role in UI) is deleted, the `ClusterRoleBinding` that binds them to the cluster-admin ClusterRole stays behind.\n\nThis issue allows a user to continue having access to clusters after they have been unassigned from the custom admin global role or the role has been deleted.\n\nPlease consult the associated  [MITRE ATT\u0026CK - Technique - Account Access Removal](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/) for further information about this category of attack.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability is addressed by removing the corresponding `ClusterRoleBindings` whenever the admin `GlobalRole` or its `GlobalRoleBindings` are deleted. Previously orphaned `ClusterRoleBindings` are marked with the annotation `authz.cluster.cattle.io/admin-globalrole-missing=true` and should be deleted manually.\n\nOrphaned ClusterRoleBindings can be listed with:\n```\nkubectl get clusterrolebinding -o jsonpath=\u0027{range .items[?(@.metadata.annotations.authz\\.cluster\\.cattle\\.io/admin-globalrole-missing==\"true\")]}{.metadata.name}{\"\\n\"}{end}\u0027\n```\n\nPatched versions of Rancher include releases `v2.12.3`, `v2.11.7`.\n\nComplications with the restricted admin functionality prevented the patches from being included in `v2.10` and `v2.9`.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf the deployment can\u0027t be upgraded to a fixed version, users are advised to manually identify the orphaned `ClusterRoleBindings` and remove them.\n\n### References\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n- Contact the [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries.\n- Open an issue in the [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository.\n- Verify with our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/).",
  "id": "GHSA-j4vr-pcmw-hx59",
  "modified": "2025-10-29T15:42:32Z",
  "published": "2025-10-24T15:06:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-j4vr-pcmw-hx59"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32199"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/pull/52303"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2023-32199"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rancher user retains access to clusters despite Global Role removal"
}


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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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