{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.12.30"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "jodit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.12.31"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62324"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79",
      "CWE-83"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T19:08:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\njodit\u0027s `sanitizeHTMLElement` neutralizes a `javascript:` `href` using a bare `href.trim().indexOf(\u0027javascript\u0027) === 0` check. This omits the normalization jodit applies to every other URL attribute: `isDangerousUrl` strips control bytes with `value.replace(/[\\u0000-\\u0020]+/g, \u0027\u0027)` and lowercases the value before testing the scheme. Because the `href` check does neither, it is bypassed by three obfuscation classes, all confirmed firing on click against the shipped 4.12.30 build:\n\n1. Case variants: `JAVASCRIPT:`, `Javascript:`, `jaVaScRiPt:` (the check is case-sensitive).\n2. A leading C0 control byte, e.g. a `\\x01` prefix before lowercase `javascript:` (`trim()` does not remove bytes in the `\\x00`-`\\x08` / `\\x0e`-`\\x1f` range, but the browser strips a leading control byte before resolving the scheme).\n3. An embedded tab or newline inside the scheme, e.g. `java\\tscript:` or `java\\nscript:` (the browser strips tab/newline from a URL, but `indexOf(\u0027javascript\u0027)` sees the broken word and does not match).\n\nThe dangerous href survives `editor.value =` assignment and the on-change LazyWalker, persisting in the stored editor value. A victim who clicks the link in any consumer that renders the stored value (readonly editor, server-rendered page, `innerHTML` consumer) runs attacker-controlled JS in that page\u0027s origin.\n\n### Details\n\nThe check is in `sanitizeHTMLElement` at `src/core/helpers/html/safe-html.ts:213`:\n\n```js\nif (safeJavaScriptLink \u0026\u0026 href \u0026\u0026 href.trim().indexOf(\u0027javascript\u0027) === 0) {\n    attr(elm, \u0027href\u0027, location.protocol + \u0027//\u0027 + href);\n    effected = true;\n}\n```\n\n`href.trim()` removes leading/trailing ASCII whitespace only, and `indexOf(\u0027javascript\u0027)` is case-sensitive and literal. So the check fails to fire whenever the scheme is upper/mixed-case, prefixed by a non-whitespace control byte, or split by an embedded tab/newline - all of which a browser still resolves to `javascript:` on click (URI schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 3986 section 3.1; leading control bytes, tabs and newlines are stripped from a URL during parsing).\n\nThe same file already contains the correct routine, `isDangerousUrl()` (line 176), used for every other URL attribute (`src`, `data`, `action`, `formaction`, `poster`, `background`, `xlink:href`):\n\n```js\nfunction isDangerousUrl(value, tagName) {\n    const normalized = value.replace(/[\\u0000-\\u0020]+/g, \u0027\u0027).toLowerCase();\n    if (/^(?:javascript|vbscript|livescript|mocha):/.test(normalized)) {\n        return true;\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n`isDangerousUrl` strips every control byte and ASCII space (`/[\\u0000-\\u0020]+/g`) and lowercases before testing the scheme, so it resists all three obfuscations. But `href` never goes through it: the attribute list `isDangerousUrl` is applied to (`URL_ATTRIBUTES`) is commented \"besides href\", and `href` is handled only by the weaker `indexOf` check. Both the synchronous value-set path (`onBeforeSetNativeEditorValue` -\u003e `safeHTML` -\u003e `sanitizeHTMLElement`) and the asynchronous on-change path (`sanitizeAttributes` -\u003e `sanitizeHTMLElement`) use that same weak check.\n\nPositive controls (filter is otherwise live): a plain lowercase `javascript:` href IS neutralized: jodit rewrites the value to `location.protocol + \u0027//\u0027 + href`, so it reads `about://javascript:...` on an about:blank test page and `https://javascript:...` on an https page. A leading ASCII space or tab IS caught by `trim()`; the bypass is specific to the un-normalized forms above.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nDefault configuration. Assign a payload to the editor and read back the stored value:\n\n```js\nconst editor = Jodit.make(\u0027#editor\u0027);\neditor.value = \u0027\u003ca href=\"JAVASCRIPT:alert(document.domain)\"\u003eclick me\u003c/a\u003e\u0027;\n// editor.value getter returns the href unchanged:\n//   \u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\"JAVASCRIPT:alert(document.domain)\"\u003eclick me\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\ndocument.getElementById(\u0027view\u0027).innerHTML = editor.value;\n// Clicking \"click me\" runs alert(document.domain) in the consumer\u0027s origin.\n```\n\nThe same persists for the leading-control-byte form (a `\\x01` prefix before lowercase `javascript:`) and the embedded-tab/newline forms (`java\\tscript:` / `java\\nscript:`). Verified live on the shipped `es2021/jodit.min.js` for jodit 4.12.30. Positive controls in the same run: `\u003cimg src=x onerror=...\u003e` stripped; lowercase `javascript:` neutralized to `location.protocol + \u0027//\u0027 + href` (`about://...` on the about:blank test page used here, `https://...` on an https page).\n\n### Impact\n\nStored click-XSS. An attacker with write access to an editor instance (content author, or comment author in a multi-user application) stores a crafted `javascript:` link. Any user who clicks it in a view that renders the stored value (readonly editor, server-rendered page, `innerHTML` consumer) runs attacker-controlled JS in that origin. One user interaction (the click) is required. A consumer that re-sanitizes the editor output before rendering is not affected.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nRoute `href` through the existing `isDangerousUrl()` rather than the bespoke `indexOf` check. `isDangerousUrl` already strips control bytes and lowercases, so it closes the case, control-byte, and embedded-whitespace bypasses at once:\n\n```diff\n-\tif (safeJavaScriptLink \u0026\u0026 href \u0026\u0026 href.trim().indexOf(\u0027javascript\u0027) === 0) {\n+\tif (safeJavaScriptLink \u0026\u0026 href \u0026\u0026 isDangerousUrl(href, elm.nodeName.toLowerCase())) {\n \t\tattr(elm, \u0027href\u0027, location.protocol + \u0027//\u0027 + href);\n \t\teffected = true;\n \t}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-j839-gqq4-gf9j",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T19:08:20Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T19:08:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xdan/jodit/security/advisories/GHSA-j839-gqq4-gf9j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xdan/jodit/commit/5fba6ef2381d151d7cb8e3c5ad0b9996af0f97b0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xdan/jodit"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xdan/jodit/releases/tag/4.12.31"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Jodit has incomplete javascript: scheme normalization in sanitizeHTMLElement href check that allows link XSS"
}